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2 Problems of Oqmktional h c k & p  
1. 
THE CONTINUING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM 
AND THE FOREIGN RELATTONS OF THE 
SOVIET W O N  
Comrades: More than three years haw m d  since the 
Sixteenth C o w  The period is not a very long one. But 
it has been fuller in content than any other period I do not: 
think a single period in the last &a& has been m rich in events 
as this period 
In the ecorsomic sphere thme years have k e n  years of con- 
tinuing world economic crisis. The crisis has a f f d  not only 
industry but wen agriculture as a whole. The crisis has not 
only raged in the sphere of production and trade, but has also 
swept iato the sphere of &t and the ckdation of money, 
and has overturned the e8tabUed d t  and currency relation- 
ships h c t n  countries. Formerly, there were dipput- here 
and there as to whether there was a worId economic crisis or not, 
but now nobody argues about this became the existen= of the 
crisis and its devastating etltcts art oaly too obvious. Now the 
controversy centers around another question, vk., is them a way 
out of the &is or not? And if there is a way out, where is it 
In the politic1 sphere these years have btcn years of grow- 
ing -ten= in relations both as between -pi& counttits 
as wefI as within the respective countries. The war between 
Japan and China and the occupation of Manchuria which have 
=rained relations in the Far East; the Victory of f& in Get. 
umph of the idea of rcvrmche which have 
in Europe; the withdrawal of Japan and 
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)Gtrmany #ram the +e of Nations which hr givm a anr 
imprms to the growth of armaments and to the preparations I;h am irnpuLbt war; defeat of fzwim in Spsuq nm 
'once again s h o d  that the ~ I u t i m a r y  crisis is maturing d 
thpt fh is not Iong lived by a Iong w a v c h  are the 
most important fam of the pttiod undu review. It b not sut- 
rhc mnd mwuda disamme~.t is &dY and d i r d y  being 
replad by a trend towards arming a d  
Amidst the surging waves of eEQIlODnie shDcks *d tniI;taq 
phial ~rtasttoph, the U.S.SR stands out done, like a 
r d ,  continuing iu wOrk of &t construction and its &ght 
to V e  pact, While in e t a l i s t  a- ehe eoonomic 
d i s i s d r a g i n g ,  intheU.S.S.Rpgma iscontiauing both 
in the sphere of industfy and iD the sphere of &griculmre. 
While in =pitalist am& f d  preparations arc in pmg- 
ieas for a new war, for a ncw d d n m o a  . .  . of the world and 
sphere3 of infIuenq the USSR. is eontinuiag its syseematic 
and stubborn smggIe Pgainae the menaot of war and for p c e ;  
and it annot be aid &t the efForts of. the U.SS.R in this 
sphere have been quite unwccwfl. 
Such is a piaute of the international situation at the 
Let US pass on to m m h  the main data on h e  d 
and politi& p i d o n  of the capitalist countries. 
1. THE: MOW- OF T H E  ~ N O W I C  RISIS lN 
Cnmm ComTms 
The present ecommic crisis in capidst countries difitts 
from alI andogous among other by the fact that 
it is the longest and most pmtmted &is. Formerly, crises , 
lasted ont or two ycan; the present crisis, however, is now in its 
H o w b t h e u n p t c e w k n d y p r o ~ d ~ e r o f t h t p r e s -  
ent industrial crisis to be exphimi? 
1t L m beexpIained &;stof d by the fact that the ; n d d  
ct;si a g e d  w q  c8pi& couptry without c x q h  pQd 
made it cWdt for some countties to maneuver at the ettpwat 
of 0th- 
Secondly, it is to be explained by the fact that the i n d d  
crisis b e  in- with the a&an a h i s  which a g e d  
all thc ;I%rarian a d  semi-agr& counttie without exaption, 
and this could not but make the industrial ccisia mow cwnpli- 
catcd aad 'profound- 
&is hame more acute in this period and & e d  all 
:of agriculturt, including a t & - r a i i q  
of pabgfrwn ma&eIabor tohandlabor,to thembstitu 
of the horn for tht tractor, to thc sharp dimmution in the uw 
of and sometimes to the complete abandoament of a a i W  fe 
tilizerg whid  c a d  the i a d d  
Lady, and what is most important, it 
the fact &at the in- ahh broke out 
of the gnscrd d i s  of e a p i m k  when =pi 
and dqxudeat countries c h t  -gth and d t y  it bad be- 
fore the war and the October RevoIution, whm industry in the 
capitafist countries is suflcring from the heritage it received fm 
the impetiaht war in the shape of the chronic w o k  of enter- 
p r k  under capacity, and af an m y  of unwnployed numbering 
millions from which it is no longer able to release itself. 
S d  are the cimmxanm which determine the extremely 
character of the present industrial crisis. It is these 
circumstanca, tm, that explain the fact that the crisis has not 
k e n  restricted to the sphere of production and trade, but has 
also affected the credit system, cummy, the sphere of debt obli- 
gacions, etc., and has M e n  down the traditionally established 
relations bth between separate countries as we1 as htween 
social groups in the separate countries. 
An impottant role in thi was played by the drop in the price 
of commodities; Notwithstanding tht resbtana of the monop- 
olist cart&, the drop in prices increased with elemental force, 
and the drop in prices occurred primarily and mostIy 'in regard 
to the commodities of the unorganized commodity owners, Gz., 
peasants, a r t h q  small capitalists; the dmp was padud and 
smaIIet in degree .in regard to the prices of commodities offered 
by the or* commodity owners, &, the capitalists united 
in cartels. The drop in prices made the position of debtors 
(manufacturers, adtam, peasants, erc) intolerable, while on 
the othet hand it placed the creditors in an unprehted ly  
privileged position. Such a situation had to lead, and really 
did I d ,  to the coIossaI bankruptcy of frms and of sepatate 
mtreprmeurs. During the past three ytars tens of thousands 
of joint stock companies were ruincd in this way in the United 
States, in Getmany, in England and in France. Thc bankruptcy 
of joint stock companies was followed by the depredation of the 
currency, which to sane extent eased the position of the debtors. 
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Depreciation of currency was foliowed by tht Icgalixed non- 1 
payment of debts, both foreign and intend The oohp of 
such banks as rht h t a d t  and Drtsden Bauks in Germany, 
- the Ktedit Anstalt in Austria and aiao conams like the bwger 
concern in Swcdea, the Insull Company in the United States, 
etc., is well known to alh 
It g w  without sa* that h i e  phenomena which shook 
the foundations of the credit system had to bring in their train, . 
and did bring in their train, the casation of payment8 on mdits 
and foreign 1- the camtion of payments of iatct-Allid 
debts, the -tion of the export of apical, thc further diminu- 
tion of foreign tradq the f& ~ u & a  of the exptr  of 
commodities, the intensifidon of the struggle for foreign mar- 
kets, trade war tntwcen countries and-dumping. Yes, mm- 
rades, dumping. I do not mean the alleged Soviet dump& 
about which only very re;tly certain no& deputies in the 
noble parliaments of Europe and America were shouting until 
they were hoarse. I mean the teal dumping that is now being 
praaised by nearly all the " a ~  states, about which the 
gallant and noble deputies maintain a ptudmt d a c e .  
It goes without saying also rbat rhese dcstru&ve phenomena 
aec~mpanying the ind+ aLi which operated outside the 
spbtre of production could not but in their turn id tuna  the 
. course of the industrial crisis and make it more intense and 
more complicated 
Such is the general picture of the movement of the indus- 
trial crisis. 
L Here arc a few figures 'taken from official materid whieh 
illustrate the. movemeat of the industrial crisis in the p&d 
under review. 
I I 
1931 1932 1933 
1619 184.7 201.6 
U% . . . . , . . . . . , . . . 100D 7 63.1 53.8 649 
.... ... ... .. . 100.0 92.4 836 835 &I 
88.3 71.7 59.8 66.8 
891 #.I 77.4 
As you see, this table BpeaEs for i d f .  
industry in ehe principal apiulisr auntria d d i d  
I - from yeat to yeat compPted with 1929 and began to 
ody in I93,1rhou& it has not 4 rhe kPeI 
of 1929 by a long way yet-hdwtry in the USSR i n m a d  
1 w h i k i n ~ i a t h t p ~ p a l ~ o o u n t r i t s ~ o n  
- the average a reduetiom of 25 per etnt and more in tIae yolume 
of production at the end of 1933 comp;uad with the I d  of 
1929, the industry of rhc U.S.SR during &is period grm m m  
', than twia its & Le, inmead mare than 100 per ctnr. 
Judging by this table it may stun that of the four +tab 
aountries England occupb the moa f a d k  
'rhat is aor quite sn. If we mke the iachrs#y of 
and compare it with the p w a c  level we shall $tt a rn 
. VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
(Pm cmt of prewar Iml) 
1913 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
USSA ...... loo 1943 252.1 314.7 359.0 391.9 
115.9 91.4 1102 
83.0 825 852 
G u m m y  . . . . .  100 113.0 998 81.0 67.6 75.4 
Ftaa~e .. . . .. .. 100 139.0 1a.O 1244 96.1 107.6 

mly, side by side with the wpf-at ion lmm,  the operation of 
the internal economic forces of apitdism also has effect here. 
' 
Capitalism has succeeded in somewhat easing the p i t h  
of industry at the expense of the w o r k e r s i n ~ e a s i n ~  heir ex- 
ploitation by inamsing the intensity of their fabor; at the ex- 
pense of the !-& pursuing a pohy of paying the lowest 
price for the product of tkit labor, for foodstuffs and partly 
for raw matetiah; at thr expense of the pearants in the colonies 
and in the economu~Ily weak cosntrjeAy still further forcing 
down the price8 of the prod- of their labor, priacipaUy of 
raw materials, and dm of f d t u f f s ,  
Does this mean that we are witndng a transition from a 
&is to an ordinary depremion which brings in its train a new 
boom and dourkhg industry? No, it does not mean that. At 
dl wents at rhe present tint there arc no data, direct or in- 
that indiate the approach d an indusd  boom in capidst 
cpuntries. More than that, judging by all thine there m n o t  
be such data, at least in the near fume. There amnot be, be- 
muse all the unfavorable conditions which prevent industry in 
the capitalist countria from rKag to any serious exteat d 
continue m operate. I have in mind the marinuing general & 
of -pitarism in the midst of which the economic c r i i  is pro- 
eeedtng, the chronic working of the enberpPises under -city, 
the chronic mass untmploymtnt, the interwaving of the indus- 
trial crisis with tht agricultural crisis, the k c e  of tendencies 
towards any serious renewal of basic capita1 which usually her- 
alds the appmch of a boom, etc., etc. 
Apparently, what we are witnessing is the transition from 
the lowest point of d&c of industry, from the lowest depth 
of the industrial &is to a depression, not an ordrnary depression, 
but to a dep& of a special kind which does not lead to a new 
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boom and flourisbuag induatty, but wkich, or! rhe &r hPnd, 
h not force it Id to the Iowtst point of ddke.  
A result of the protracted economic crisis was the hitherto 
u n p d c p d  acutenea of the pofitica1 situation in capitalist 
counfrieg, both within the r q c a i v e  cotmtriea as weIT a8 berween 
rhem. 
The heeded struggle for foteigtl markets, the abolition 
of the last vestiges of free d e ,  prohibitive tariffs, trade wat, 
war, dumping and many other adogous mcpsures 
. which demonstwe exmeme f iah 'd ism in tlw)mmic p o b ,  have 
c a d  the relations benveen the w t r h  to k o r m  cxtmmIy 
wte, have created the soil for military co&m and have 
b r o d t  war to the front as a mesas for a new redktribution of 
the world and spheres of dueme in favor of the strong* 
sta* 
Japan$ war against China, the occupation of Manchuria, 
Japan's with&& from the Leagut of Nations and her ad- 
vance in North China have d to make rhe situation s# 
mom acute. The intensified struggle for the Pacih and the 
growth of the naval armaments of Japan, United States, Eng- 
had a d  France, repmezit the m d ~  of this h c m d  auirmm. 
Germany's withdrawal fwm & Leagw of Nations and the 
spectre of rermrcbe have given a fresh imprms to the astmatsa 
of the situation and to the growth of armamen& in guropt. 
I t ~ n o t s ~ t h a t b u r g e o i s p a ~ i n o w d r a g g i n g  
out a miserable existence, and that idle talk about dhimmen~ 
is being replaced by ' % h % t t '  tak  about ooB m 

t h t C o m m u a i s t ~ ~ r m d a a d ~ t # ~ ~ -  
Porisr me&& in order to &tah their &ap$liP. 
Chvi&n and preparation for war as the maiD +Itmante.ol 
fweign policy, b d i n g  the w o r k i i  c b  ad t m r  in the a p k  
o f f t o m e p l i q a s a n e ~ m e a n s f o r a ~ t h c r r & r  
of future war f r o n d  is what is particularly enga@q dw 
minds of eontemprarg impetiabt plitiks. 
It  is not surpdhg that Easdsm bas now k o m  the m m  
f&onsblt d t y  among mc08t hurgwis politi- 
I d o n o t m a n f ~ i n g e n e &  Imean, p h d y ,  fadimof 
the German type, which is incorrectly d e d  national^ 
'- fw the mast searrhixtg exambation wil l  fail to rweaI evm an 
atom af d a h m  in it, 
'' In this m&on the victory of fascism in Germany must 
.- be regarded not only as a symptom of the weaknegs of rhe work- .' ing class and as a resuk of the betrayal of the warking &a by 
' ' Sacid-Demacy, which paved dte way for f m  it must a h  
h regarded as a symptom of the weaknw of the bomgmbit, as 
a & m  of the fact that the bourgeoisie is h d y  d b  w 
rule by'the old methods of prliamtntatiwn add bourgeois dam- 
r oeracy, and, as a mmiequence, is compelled im its b policy c 
e r t  to terroristic methods of adnhismtton-ic must k taken 
our of &e -at situation on the basis of a paadd fearigtl 
plicy, as amnsequence of which it iQ compkd  to r e s ~ t  to a 
porky of war. 
- That t the position. 
Thus, you set that things are movhg towads a new imprid- 
iut waz as a way out af the present situatioa 
01 cotme &ere are no grounds for w s h g  that dm 
a prod& il rtpl out. On the mt&, it  mu^ d m  
17 . , 
tbe siruation still m o E  More than that, it will 4 y  un- 
leash revolution and put in +n the very existence of =pi- 
talism in a n k  of counties, as was the c a ~  in the course 
of the h t  impridh war. And if, notwithtanding the 
e x p i a c e  of the first imperiafist war, the hurgeois poli&ians 
dutch at war as a drowning man dutch  at a sttaw, it show 
&at they have becMllt utterly eonfud, haw reached an im- 
passe, and are ready to rush headlong over the precipice. 
It will not be amiq therefore, to briefly examine the p k  
for the organhation of war which are now being hatched in the 
&Its of bourgeois poliriciana 
Some think that war must be organhd against one of tht 
Great Powers. They dink of imposing a crushing defeat upon 
it and of improving their own affairs at its w. Let us 
assume that they organize such a war. What can come of it? 
AS is wd known, during the first impetialist war it was intended 
to destroy one of the Great Powers *., Germany, and ta profit 
at her expense. And what came of it? They did not destroy 
G m a a y ,  but in Germany they sowed such a hatred for the 
vietors and mated such a rich soil for revanche that they have 
not b m  abIe to dear up the revoking mesa they have made wen 
to this day, and will not, perhaps, be.able to do so for some 
time, But instead, they got the smash-up of capitalism in Russia, 
the Yictory of the proietarian revolution in R u s h  and-of course 
--the Swiet Union. What gyaranree is there that the stewd 
imperialistic war wil1 produce "better" d t s  for them than the 
ha? Would it not be more correct to assume that rbe o@te 
will be tht case? 
Others think that war should be organiPtd against a country 
that is militarily weak, but which reptcstna an extensive market 
-for example, against China, which moreover, they have $i9.- - 
~ d ~ b t ~ a s a ~ i u ~ ~ ~ o ~ t h t  
w o r d , b U t ~ ~ P s e t e l ~ ~ ~ ~ u n o ~ ~ *  
' ~ t o b e ~ h y s t r o n g ~ t e a  Appma&,*raallcta 
diPide i tupeomplaee lyandi tnp~vethc ir&atsr t t i t9~  
Ltturraa~rtmeehattheyotgankcsuchawar. Whatwill- 
of if? It is well known that in fhe begrnniffg of the n & c d  
oenturp&esamtopinionwasheldinrcgardtaItalyatrdGerr 
maay as L now held in re& to Qiaa, fiz., they w m  r~ 
gar& arr ''mot+ territories" and not mtq a d  they 
wm edavtd. But what came of it? As is well kaom, it re 
r u I d  in wars of independence waged by Gemany a d  Italg 
. sad tEEeir d t % t i o n  into in+dent stares. It d t e d  in in- 
creased hatred in the hearts of the peoples of Lheae wnm* 
for & o p p ~  the d t s  of which have not been liquidad 
to th day ai~d will not, perhaps, b liquidated for aome the. 
The guestion a r k :  what guarantee b thtre that the disme 
ding will not + as a r d t  of an imperkht war againsr 
china?. 
Saill -othm think that war abnuld h organid by a 
w'' say, the Gemran w-" against an t%f&t pfi- 
m ~ r i l y a g a i n s t h s l a v ~ t h a t o a l ~ d a w a r ~ p r o o i d e a w s t y  
out of the situation because it b the MQ~ of the nmp&r raceH 
to fueiliae & Tnferior race'' and rule over it. Let us amme that 
tbiarlueerthaory,~hichisasfarmOdfrors~~rrs~vetl 
hheatth,Ittusassumethat tb i sqoeer~ i sput inmprac -  
, th. WhawilIarmeofit? X t i s w e l I k n o w a t b a r ~ ~  
regarded the ancestors af the ~ t - d a y  Ger~lans and F d  
in tlw same way ae the repraentativee of rhe nsuped6r tpce'' now 
rcgatdtheSlavonietribes, ItiswdIknownrhataadatRcme 
~ t t d t b a s a n ~ i n f e r i o r ~ " # ~ w ~ ~ y  
: ir rn to be e d y  s u b o ~ t e d  to t#e esuperior mcq* -- 
: "p3the,"#4bmW-lwkrirbe.li4rada. 
, R m n c M m c g t o u n d , f o r t h q w h i c h - o t h r i d a b o u t  
the rep-tatim of the pmeat "superior race." ( L o 4  ap- 
plmcse.) But what amt of it? Thc resuft was that the non- 
Romans, i.e., all the %batiaw" united against the common 
enemy, hurled d w d v e s  against Rome and overthrew it. The 
question arises: what guarantee is there that the claim of the 
representatives of the present "superior race" will not lead to 
I the same deplorable mults? What guarantee is there thar the 
fascist-litera y pobtkiam in Berlin wiII be more fortunate thm 
the aneitnc and exptxienced conquerors in Rome? Would it not 
be more coma to assume that the opposite will be the case? 
. . Still others, again, thinlr that war should be organized against 
the U.S.S.R. Their plan is to mnash the U.S.S.R., divide up its 
territory and profit at its expense. It would be a mistake to be- 
lieve that it is only certain military circles in Japan who think 
in this way, We know that similar plans are being hatched in 
the & of pliriml leaders of certain states of Europe. kt 
I us assume that thae genthen pass from words m deeds. What 
can come of it? There a n  hardly be any doubt that such a war 
would be a very dangerous war for the bourgeoisie. It would be 
a very dangerous war, not only because the peoples of the 
US.S.R would 6ght to the wry dearh to preserve the gains of 
t the Revolution; it would be a very dangerow war fot the h- 
gto& dm beruse such a war will be waged not only at the 
b t s  but & in the rear of the enemy. The bourgeoisie need 
have no doubt that the numerous friends of the working clam 
of the U.S.S.R. in Burope and in Asia will be sure to strike 
a bIow in the rear at their oppressors who commenced a m i m d  
war against the fatherland of the working class of aII countries. 
And kt not Messieurs the bourgeoisie blame w if on the mortow 
I of the outbreak of such a war they will miss certain of the gov- 






, happily ding '%y the p c t  of pi," (bud &wee) Onc 
such war a g a h  the U.SSR ha ken  waged, a h d y 3  if you 
&, hfteetl years ago. AI is  w d  known, fhe u & d y  
estbemevl lChdJothtdthiswatina~form+*tht  
inwlsim of f~~ mbea'' You Kcmder  of course that this 
war rallied the t o k  of our country in a single a m p  06 brok 
& who &faded theit W Q ~  and peasand laomidad 
a ~ t h e f ~ f a e 0 o t h a n d n ; l i l .  Youkno~howitmdwl. 
Xten&wi th the in&khgdt iv tnh  ourcountryad 
the e a & W  of ~ I u d o n a r p  Corncis of Actiosl in Europe. 
It erto. h a r d y  be d m k d  &at a scsDtrd war against tht U.SSR 
d 1 4  to the complete defeat of the to mid 
m a n u m b e t o f a r m r r i e s i o E ~ a r $ i a ~ a n d t o t h e  
I ovtrthtrnv of the bourgeois.l~pdlord go~emmttlts in thae 
am& 
Such .are the war p h  of the perpLd h u r g d  poIiticiens, 
As you see, they art not & t i e  either fm their bril- 
b . o r  valor. (A*.) 
But if the bourgeok c h m  the path d war, then the 
w o r k i n g ~ i a t h e m p i t a I i s t q o ~ t r i e s w h o ~ w h d U Q O d  
to despair by four years of aids and ~ ~ e n e  takes the 
path of mlution, That means that a cwohtionary mbia i a  
. m9tuingandwilIeonriawmmaturc. Pit$rkmomthebour- 
~ ~ t 8 e n ~ i a i & w a r ~ ~ t h t m o t c f r o  
'I q u a n d y i t ~ p o t t d ~ m e & o & i n & c ~ ~  
&wxkhgcIass &the toilingpsmrryl tkmnct willthe 
7 revolutionary crisis nmmL 
Swae tbiak that as as a revolutiaary a h i s  
0~6~1"8tbebour&iernustdiopiatoahopd~positiom,& 
im end is pdaadd, that the of the d u b  h 
~ o n d d m t a l l t h q h v e t o & i s m P V P i t i O h & b O U f -  
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m ~PU, d nd mw up vidDdo~ -1utions. T ~ L  L a
found mistake. The victory of revolution never cornea by 
tself. It has to be prepared for and won. And only a strong, 
revolutionarg party can prepare for and w h  victory. . 
ents o~cur when tbe situation is revolutionary, yhen thc ' 
& of the bourgeoisii L shaken to its very foundations, and yee- 
the victory of the revolution d m  not come, h u s e  there is no 
d u t h a t y  parcg of tht proletariat &ntly st- h d  au- 
~ t a d v e  to lead the massea and take power. It would be un- 
wist to btIicvt that such wascsn cannot m r .  
In this connection, it will not be amiaP to d l  Lain's pro- 
phetic wot& on a revolutionary crisis, uttered at she Second 
&ngrms of the Gmmunist ~nr~rnat iod :  
I We have now ~ o m e  to the question of the r e v o l u w  criab as 
the basis of our tevolutianary action. And here we must fint of all 
note two d p r e a d  errors. On the me hand, fhc t c ~ -  . 
mists depict thia crisis simply as %mat," to use the elegant 
expteasioPl of &t Bngliih. On the other band, revolurharim~ some- * try to p ~ w e  that &ere is ahlutely no way out of the +. 
That is a mistake. There in no auch thing ar absoludy bop& 
It is quite easy w underswnd how di&dt u has been for 
tht U,SSJL to pursue its peace in tbis atmosphere p i -  
sonod with the miasma of war combinations. 
In the midst of this emf-thew= hullabeloo which is going 
on in a number of eountrieg the U.S.S.R. during these yem 
has stood f i d y  aad indomitably by its position of peace, fight- 
'@ against the menace of war, hghting to ptcsttve - going 
out to meet coitntries which in one way or another stand 
for the pfeservatim of pace, exposing and tearing the ma& 
from those who are ~repating for and promking war. 
What did the U.S.SR. rely on in this dig,cult and complex 
struggle for p e e ?  
(a) On its growing economic and political might. 
(b) On the mral Bupport of millions of the working c l s s  
in wttp country who art vitally i n t d  in the p-tiotl 
of P= 
(c) the common saw of those countrim which for rhis 
or that motive are not interested in disturbing the peace, a n d  
which want to &v&p commtrcial relations with such a punc- 
tual dent as the U.SS.R 
(d) Pi- our gIorioarr anny, which is ready ro defend 
our countty against attack from withut. 1 
On &a basis arm our am* for tht condusion oi pa& 
of non-aggre&n and of pacts dehhg the aa;gresm with m J 
, migh&ng stamL You h o w  that this Gunpi@ ha bm 
mausful. As is kwrwn, pam of non=aggmsion have btrn 
L ' o o a j u d a d m t ~ w i t h t h t m a j o r i t y o f o u r ~ i n r h c :  1 W~ud~thcSouth,~tl~F&dlodPo~ba& . i i  M 
with such countries as France and Italy; and pam defining the 
a- have been conduded with t k  writ neighking 
stat% indudhg the Little Entente. 
Oa rhis basis a h  the friendship between the U.S.S.R and 
Turkey was consolidated, reiations between tht U.S.S.R and 
Italy have impmed and have become indisputably satisfaaory, 
reiations with France, Poland and other Baltic stata have im- 
proved, relations have betn restored with the US..k, China, erc. 
Of the facts r e k i n g  the s u m  of the peace plicy of 
the U.SSR two facts of indisputably serious significance shouid 
be noted and singled out. 
1 have in mind, first, the change for the better that hap taken 
place receatly in tk relations between the U.S.SR and Pohd, 
between the U.S.S.R. and France. As is well known, our re- 
I 
lations with Poland in the past were not at all good Rqmiu~- 
taam of our state were asmahated in Poland. PoIand re- 
garded herself as the barrier of the Wwster~ states against the 
. U.S.S.R. All and sundry imperialists looked upn Poland as 
the vanguard in the went of a military attack upon the U.S.S,R 
The relations between the U.S.S.R. and France weie not much ! 
better. It is sddent to r e d l  the facts in the history of the trial I 
of the Ramzin wreckers' group in Moscow in order to restore 
in one's mind the, picture of the relations between the U.S.S.R. 
and France. But now these undesirable relations are g r a W y  
beginning to disappear. They are bemg replaced by other rela- 
tions, which cannot be orkvise  k i M  than relations of 
rapprochement. It is not only that we haw conduded pacts of 
non-aggression with these eountties, although these pacts ia 
t h l m  are of very serious importance. The most important 
thing first of all is that the amcsphert charged with m u d  
distrust t begking to be dissipated This does not meatl, of 
mum, that the incipient process of rapprochement caa he re- 
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garded as sufliciently stable and as ultimate stto 
mu. Surprises and z ipga  in policy, for example itz PdPnd, 
where anti-Soviet moods are seilI strong, cannot be regarded 
as being excluded by a long way. But a c h w  for the better iq 
our relations, krqcct ive of its r d r s  in the future, is a faet 
worthy of being noted and put h the forefront as a factor in the 
I 
advancement of the cause of peace. 
What is the cause of rhis c b g e ?  What s t imula~  it? 
First of all, the growth of the strcngth and might of rhe 
U.S.S.R. In our tima it is nar the custom to give any con- 
ion to the weak--consideration is only given to the -. 
Then there have been certain changes in the policy of Germany 
which reflect the growth of rwanche-iist and imperialist moods 
In this corneaion certain German politicians say that now 
the U.S.S.R. has taken an mientation towards France and P+ 
land, that from being an opponent of the V d e a  Treaty it 
has k m e  a supporter of it sad that this change is to be q- 
pl-d by .the e s e a b b e n t  of a fascist regime in Germany. 
This is nor uue. Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic 
about the fascist regime in Germany. But fascism is not the 
issue here, if only for the reason that fasdsm, for example in 
Italy, did not prevent the U.S.S.R. estabIishing very goad rela- 
tions with that country. Nor are tk alleged changes in our 
attitude towards the VersaiIies Treaty the point of issue. It is 
not for us, who have experienced the shame of the Btait-Li~wk 
Peace, to sting the praises of the Verdles Treaty. We merdy 
do not agree to the world bemg flung into the tbroa of a new 
war far the sake of this treaty. The same thing must be said 
in regard to the alleged new orientation taka by the V.S.SJR 
We never had my orhitation towards Germany nor have we 
wwatda Poland and Fmnce. Out oritataria in 
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the paat and our ohta t ion  at the pwat h a  is towards the 
USS.R and towards the U.S.S.R. alont. ( L a d  &use.) 
And if the interests of the U.S.S.R demand r a p k t  
with this or that counuy which is not interested in disturbing 
pace, we shall take this sttp without bitatinn. 
No, that is not the pint. The point is that the policy of 1 
Germany has changed. The point is that even before the p-t 
German p.liti&m came into power, and &Iy after bhty 
w n e  into power, a fight between wo lines broke out 
in Germany, between the old policy which found e x p r d n  in 
the well-known treaties k e e n  tht U.S.SR and Germany and 
the 'hew" policy which in the main recalls the policy of the ex- 
G i e r  of Germaoy who at one time occupied the L k a h q  un- 
dertook a march against Leningrad and transformed the Baltic 
1 muntrie into a place d'mmes f a  this march; and this 'hew" 
I policy is obviousl~ gaining the upper hand over the old polity. The fact rhat the supporters of the 'hew" policy are gaining 1 supremacy in all things while the supporters of the old policy a& 
L k dhgrace m o t  be regarded as an accident. Nor can the 
well-known action of E&+tg in h d o n ,  nor the equally 
well-known &ations of Roscnberg the &rector of the foe 
eign poky of the n3urg party in Germany, bt q a d d  as acci- 
dent. That is the point, annrades. 
Secondly, I have in mind the restoration of mrmd ~e&otl% 
bttwen the W.S.SR. and the United States. There a m o r  be 
any doubt that this act has very serious signifi- for the whole 
system of iateraationsl rehtiolls. It is not only that it improves 
the chums of preserving peace, that it improves the relations 
between the two mun&es, strengthens commercial inte~~urse 
between them and rzrates a base fm m u d  eo-operation; ir is 
a laadmark between the dd, when the United States in various 
mun& was reprded as tbe burwark for a11 mrta of a d -  
d y r a m d , t o & d a d v 8 t l t a g e d b o t h c o u n t r i e s .  
S w h a t c t h e t w o ~ h u s w h k h r e f I o c t t t k t ~ o f t l #  
t o ~ t h a t t w r y e h i n g m t  
No, not e m y d l i q  went 
R e d ,  say, rhepmsm that wasbrought tobeor uponusby 
' h g h d ,  the &go on our h e  attempt to indtre 
: i n o u r i a t e r n a l & ~ a n d t a p u t o u t ~ t o t e s t o u t p w e t o f  
rusiptan#. It is true that nothing came of rhis arttmpt and that 
Iota the embargo was r&, but tht aftermath of k at- 
& k still felt in all things that oflea & relations bcowten 
h g h d  and the U*SSR, including tht negot iab  for a ewa. 
mercial treaty. And thw attach upon the U.SU. mast not 
, It is w d  known &at one d of 
p&c Iy  kaust they are not &d we must bear in mind 
&at am& on the USSR. will be made in tht futupe, that all 
. mts of merlatea wifl be ctated, a#emm to damage it wiH be 
the relations betwen the USSR. and 
of very Eonsiderable h y t .  
Japan's refusal to condude a pact of mn- of WW 
' J q p  stands in netd no than & U S S R ,  once am- * & fact that all ia not we11 in the *here of our r e h h  
Tbsamath;ngmust besoidintegardmthtruphrrcof negoh- 
&m ~~ tht Chime-Bastwn RaiIway due to no fa& of 
theU.S .S&and&inctgardtathe~gemdd& 
J w a g c a t d i  am amnitdngon thc CER., theilbgdatre&a 
of~emptoptesmtbtC.KR.,etc  m i s * ~ ~  
& f w t t h P t o n t ~ o f t b e m i I i t a y m c # h  Japanareqdy 
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advdcating ing the pns. the nmrriry for a war against rhr 
.. U.S.SR and the seizure of the Maritime Province with the 
avowed approval of another section of the military, while the 
f Japaa, instead of calling these instigators of war 
to order, is pretending &at this is not a matter that cmcems it. 
I ' It is not &cult to underatand that such c i r ~ c e s  m o t  - but ueate an atmosphere of uneasiness and uncertainty. Of 
course, we will contiah persistently to pursue the policy af peace 
and strive for an improwmeat iu our relations with Japan be- 
cause we want to improve these relations. But it does not entirely 
depend upon &. That is why we must at the same time adopt 
I all measures for the purpose of guarding our country against sur- 
prises and k prepared to defend it in the event of attack. (Loud 
.pplaure.) 
As you see, besi& s u w  in our peace plicy we also have 
I . a nwber of negative phenomena. 
I -  Such are tht foreign reIadms of the U.S.S.R. 
1 - Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of pr- peace 
F A  
and strengthening commercial relations with all countries. The 
U.S.S.R does not t h i i  of threatening anybody-let alone of - 
attacking anybody. We stand for peace and champion the cause 
- I of peace. But we are not afraid of &ears and are prepared to 
answer blow for blow against the instigators of war. (Loud ap 
!; plalcse.) Those who want peace and are striving for buPiness intercourse with us will always receive our support. h d  those 
who try to  attack our camtry-will receive a stunning rebd  to . , teach them not to poke their pig's snout into our Soviet g d m  
- again. (Loud rlpplme.) 
Such is our foreign policy. ( h d  applduse.) 





I 1  
- - - - I - - .  - - -  r . 
I Il THE CONTINUING PROGRESS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE INTERNAL POSITION OF THE U.S.S.R. 
6 I now pass to the question of the i n d  position of the - U.S.S.R From the point of view of the internal position of the 
U.S.SR., the period under review p m t s  a picture of continu- 
ously expanding progress both in the sphere of aa&nal economy 
and in the sphete of dturc. 
This progtess has not baen merely a b p I e  quantitative accu- 
mdation of strend. This pmgrwwr is rcmwfrpble for the faa 
&at it has introduced fundamental changes in the s t n m w c  of the 
U.S.S.R and has radically changed the face of the country. 
During thii period, the U.S.S.R. has k m n e  radially ttans- 
formed; it has M c d  the feat- of l a c h m h e s s  and medi- 
&. From an agm& muuq it has b e  bansformed 
into an industrial country, Ftam a land of mall individwl agri- 
culture it has become a land of eoUKtive, hrgesde mechanized 
agriculture. From an igmrane, illiterate and uncultured country 
- 
it has beeome--or rather it is becoming-* litwatt and and cul- 
t u r d  country covered with a network,of higher, mid& and ele- 
mentary schaob qmating in the lmguagm of the nation&& 
of the U.S.S.R. 
N e w  branches of industry have been created, nz., ma&e 
tooh, autbmobiie, tractor, chemial, mototccomtruction, aemplane 
5. & h q  powerful turb'mes and genera- - high-grade steel, f e r d l o y s ,  synthetic rubber, nitrates, arti- t'- 
fid fib- etc, etc. (Prolonged ~rpplause.) ' D i n g  this period r h o 4  of mw, up-to-date industrial 
ttatlpriscs have been built and started Giants like the I)nicpto- a 29 
W, -9, K m k t r o v ,  a d h y ,  Bobnld, Ural- 
amprises have bun on the basis of modem tech- ' nique. New enterprim haw been built and industria emters 
have been aeated in the natidnd republies and in the h& 
C C ~  of the UAS&--in White Rusk ,  ia the Uh&q in the 
stan, in Buryat Mongob in the Tartar Republic, in B d W a ,  
intkeU&inBggfdWcst&ria,intheFar~ttc 
More than 200,000 oolleetivt farms and 5,000 Soviet famu 
have kea oxpnkd, with new district centers and i n d d  
aentersservingdtm 
NewlargctownswithHrgeppulationslyespruqgupin 
what were fomer1y atmost v m t :  spaws. The oId towns aad in- 
d d  miters have grown emrmouly. 
I The fowdatha haw baen laid of the U r a l - K d  Combc 
. whLh d t m  the ding ma1 of K d  with thc iron are of the 
L U& Thus, 'the dream of a new metall& base in the East 
i - 
can be re+d as hapins b m e  a d t y .  
The fotutdatiom of a new oil base have been Iaid in 
tk q b n s  on the western and s o u t h  slopea of the Urd range 
41 the Ural Region, Baphkiria, and Kazakstan. 
Eviddy, the wormow capital invmted by the sate  in dl 
btanck of natiotla e m m y ,  which in the period under review 
amounted to over 60,~000,000 rubles, has not been in vain and 
L ~ g t o b e a r f n J t .  
As a resuit of t k s c  acbvantnts the national h m e  of the 
. U.S= has i n d  from 29,000,000,000 rubies in 1929 to 
50 ,~000 ,000  in 1933, while during the same period there bas 
bcm a &line in the n a d d  h e  of all capitalist aunt& 
Tt p without sayiq that dl these achitvements and all tbis 
so 
-1 
pmpw had to tea- d y  did lepd-to the further wli- - dation of the k t 4  poaition of the USS.R. 
How was it pDssible for t h e  c o l d  chatrges to have d e n  
place in a matter of three or four years in the terriwrp of an -- 
taws ~pate with a backward tcJlaiquc and a backward culture? 
Was it nct a * c ?  It would have been a miracle had this 
small economi. But it aanot be described as a miracle if we b e ~ r  
in mind that this development p  on the ha& of e x p a d  
It goes without saying that this enormous pmgrem muld t a b  
place only on the bas5 of tk suecessfd building of so+ on 
the ba& of the social labot of teas of millions of people, on tht 
basis of the advantages which the d system of economy has 
o m  the capitak and i n d i v a d  peasant systems. 
It is not s u e  therefa,  that tltt COW iu 
that & h c I i s t  &stem would 6nally p d  over all the ethers. 
We can say now that the firse, the third and the fourth social- 
economic systems no longer exist; rhe econd social-economic sys 
tern has k e n  f a d  bade to a seandary padtion while the fifth 
I 
separate q d n  of the economic and political position of the 
Of d branches of national economy the one that grew most 
Here is the comspndmg table. 
PUT OF THE WHOLE OF NATIONAL ECONOMY 
( ln  ptires of 1926-27) 
1913 1929 I930 1931 I932 I933 
- - - - - - .  
Total ...,. >,,R,. I00 100 100 100 100 100 
O f d e & i ~ t ~ i n & e w o r k o f i o d ~ ~ b t b r  
growth of the prdwtb of tmplemenu and means of p&- 
rion in tlae total Volm of dweIopmat of industry. The ftguw 
~~g the +od under & show that this item qccupicd 
the predominant psct in the total volume of in*. 
Here is the cotmspding  table. 
PER CBNT OF OUTPUT OF THE TWO MAIN GROUPS 
OF BRANCHES OF LARGHSCALB INDUSTRY 
(in ~ U C J  of 1926-27) 
Totd Vdume of Outpwc (in billions of &I) 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Totelfargegoakirrdmtry ..... 21.0 27.5 33.9 38-5 41.9 
Of wbich: 
Group "A," imphiatti and 
mmwofpducriaa ........ 102 l4.Y 18.8 22.0 213 
~ ~ p W , " ~ ' g c c d s . . 1 0 . 8  13.0 15.1 16.5 I76 
Group -A,' lmplemmtp and Percentages 
n u a n a o f ~  h... . .  48.5 52,6 55,4 5 7 .  58.0 
Group "B,"  consume^' goods. . 51.5 47.4 44.6. 43.0 4263 - --- 
T d  . . . .  , . . .. .. . .., ... 100 100 I00 100 lab 
As you ste, this table no eqlanatiotl. 
In oar country, which is d l  y o ~  achailly, indusq has 
'a special task to fulfil. It mwt remmttuct on a new t- 
b& nor d y  itself, not only aIl bran& of industry, kduldiag 
the fight industries the food and lumber indust* but it must 
also ~~ aIl ffortns of transport and all b ranch  of a d 3  
lculture. It can fulH this task onty if the engineering ind- 
the main lever for the reconsmction of national emuom-- 
pies a predominant pBw in it. The figues of the period + 
rwiew show tbat out engineering indwtty has won for i d f  the 
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PBR CEN?' OF OUTPUT OF VARIOUS BRANCHES 
OF INDUSTRY TO GROSS USSR OUTPUT 
1913 1929 1932 1933 
.............................. Coat 2.9 21 1.7 2.0 
.............................. &kc 0-8 0.4 0.5 0.6 
..................... Oil(&&) 19 1.8 13 1.1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Oil (rtfitutlg) 2.3 2.5 2.9 2.6 
Fmolww* ................... * 4.5 3.7 4fi 
Non.fetrow merdULBY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  * 1.5 1.3 1.2 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  EaginminB .I l .O 14.8 25.0 26.1 
..................... Basiechicah 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.9 
b .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18.3 152 7.6 3.3 
W& ............................ 3.1 3.1 1.9 1.8 
This shows that out industry is developing on a sound I 
foundation and that the key to A t r u a t o n 4  engheekg 
I 
iudwtry-is entirely in our hands. AU that is r e q u i d  is that I 
&odd use it skifully and rationally. 
I The development of our industry during thu a c d -  ' 
ing to 4 sectors presents an intecesthg picture. 
I 
Here is the w ~ a d i n g  table. I 
a O S S  OUTPUT OF LARGESCALE INDUSTRY kc006  
I 
ING TO SECTORS 
( In prices of 192427) I 
m M i l t h  of R d k s  A 
1929 1930 1931 I932 1933 I 
I. SocipIiPed industry . . 99.4 99.7 * 
e industry 8.3 8.8 * 7.41 7.17 
7.8 
a ) S t a t e i t l d m y  .... 99.1 909 * 
b) &-opaciveinduutry 8.3 83 
LI. P r i m  industrg . , . . 0.6 
F m  this table it will bt w m  that we have put an end ta the 
mpi& efrmears in hhstty and that the sadist syarwl af 
, economy is now the mle and m c n o p o ~  system in ow w. 
Of all the sucmws achieved by industry in the period mdet 
review the most important is the fact that it has sucectded in 
yomen, of new leaders of industry, of a whole stratwn of new 
engineers and technic& of hundreds of thousands of young 
skilled workers who have mastered the new aechaiqut, and who 
have advanced our &list industry. There cannot be any doubt 
that without them men and women industry could not have 
achieved the sucmwi it has, a d  of which it has a perfect right 
to be proud. The figures show that in this p& industry has 
traiaed for the w o ~ ~  about 8O0,OOO mom or Icsg s k b d  
workers in tbe factory trsining &Is and mote than 580,000 
engineers and achaidans in the higher technical schools, & 
sitiedi and rechnieal schools. If it is m e  that the &fern of 
cad= is a vtry serious p r o b h  of our de-t, then it must 
be admitted that our industry is beginaiag miously to master 
Such arc the main a&wemen~~ of mu industry. 
*F- not a d k .  
succcests to 4 No, it a h  has its defects. The -- prinapal of 
tht~t are: 
(a) Tht continued lag in ferrous-metdlurgy; 
(b) The Hck of order io. nm-ferrous metall~rgy; 
(c) The underrsrimation of the very serious importame of 
developing the extraction of I d  cod for the generd fuel bal- 
ance of the country (Mamw Region, Caucasus, Urals, Kara- 
ganda, Central Asia, Sibetia, the Far East, the Northern Re- 
*& *.) ; - 
(d) The abet of necessary attention to the question of ot- 
gaaixing a nrm oil brrse in the Ur& Bashkiria and Emba regions; 
(e) The absence of serious concern for the development of 
the production of mricIts of generr~l cotmrmph'm by the Iight, 
food and lumber industries; 
(f)  The a h e e  of proper attention to the -tion of de- 
veloping local industry; 
(g) A totally intolerable attitude towards the question of 
improw the puIity of p~Oducri4n; 
(h) Continued lag in the iaercase in the productivity o/ tubor, 
in the r&&n of cost of production and in the incularioa of 
cost wcounthg; 
(i) The hd organization of labar and wages, depetsonaIiza- 
tian in work and cquaIitarianism in the wages systm have not 
yet baw removed; 
(j) Blcremcrirtic mutine methods of leadership in the busi- 
rims commhhts  and th& departments, including the cwnmis- 
sariats of the light and f d  iadustriep, have not been ahtished 
by a long way yet. 
The ahlute aemity for tfie speedy remod of all these 
defem need hrdIy be explained again. As is known, the ferrous 
and nw-ferrous m e d q i d  industries did not fuM their plan 
thughout the w M e  of the first Fire-Yem Plsn priod, and they 
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fulfilled the plan of'the hst  yew of the Scad+* 
Year Plan. If t h y  -tinut b Iag behind thty m y  W 
dragoniadustryandnouacof breackintkplm. A s k &  
creation of new bass for the coal and oil ind& it is- not 
G c a l t  to understad that unlw this urpttt task is f u l w  - 
our industry and trpnspott may be rw aground The qu* 
producing articles of geeerd consumption and the d d o p m a  
of Iocd industry, a well as the qmstbm of improving the q d h y  
of output, of haeasing productivity of labor, of reducing cast 
of pduceion and inculcating cost acmundng, also need no fw 
ther explanation. As far the bad oqankt ion of Iabor and wages 
and tbe bureaucratic routine m& of h a d d i p ,  tk history 
of the Dwbas atld of the factories in the light and food indus- 
tries have shown rhat this dangerew dLcPsc o l t s  in all brracbra , 
of industry and hinders their If it is not liquidad, 
industry will just hobble 
The immediate tasks arc: 
(1) To preserve the leading rolt of the engineering industry 
in the industrial system. 
(2) To abolish the lag of ferrws-metallurgy. 
(3) To put the mn-&us m d  industry in &. 
(4) Tadtoe1oprotbt~t thctr tc t .pcdonof loddh 
all already known eoalbearing districts; to o+ new c&d& - 
(for example in tht Bureisk district in the Far East) and to con- 
Wrt the K U h  ~ K I  8 W W D ~  Drmbas. (hd &-.) 
(5) Seriously to take up the matter of orga i i iq  an oil bme 
in the districts on the w w e m  and southern $opes of the Ural I 
(6) TQ devdop the p d &  of mi& of g m d  am- 1 
(7) To unfetter local Soviet indwtry, ro give u the oppo~ 
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t 
I hlnity to display initiative in regard to the p d u c h n  of atticla of gmed consumption and to give it all possible adstance in the way of raw matetials and fuada. 
(8) To improve the puaIity of gods, to stop the output of 
' m p l e t e  ms of goods and io p d  alt t h  cotma& irre- 
spective of petsow who vioIate or evade the Iaws of the Sovitt 
&mmmr-mncerning the quality and completenu. of sets of 
(9) To seare a systematic hcmw in the productivity of 
Iabor, a reducdon in cogt of pr&ction and the inadation of 
rose acmnting. 
(10) To put an end to dtpemnalktion in work and equali- 
tarhim in wages. 
( I t )  To abolish bureaucratic mucine methods of leaddip 
in dl the depwments of the & cmmharbrn and ays t i -  
atidly su+se the fulhent of the &ions and inskctions 
of tlae leading centers by the &dinate organizatims. 
2. P~OGBBSS IN AGWCULTURB 
Development in the sphere of agriculture proceeded soma 
I 
hat Merently. In the period under review pro- in tbe main 
ranches of agriculture was accelerated much moft s h y  than * 
in industry, but neverthel~ more rapidly than in the period 
whea individual farming pdomkted. In the l i d  branch, 
however, t h e  was a reverse process--a decline in the n& 
of l i v d ;  only in 1933 wtre of propa 
and then ody in pig breediw 
Apparently, the enormow d i t y  of uniting scatted small 
peasant famu ia wlleetive farms, the difficult of p'eating 
onalmost ~caatspacea large number of b igmaad  cattle 
tsising farms ad, generally the period of rmrganiring 
individual agricuIture and putting it on new colI&ve farm rails 
which requires eonsidedle time and involves considerable out- 
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k-ll tha faaam w)tpneu 
d e d i e e i n t h t n ~ o f ~  
&.smatterof ~tbepodunde2.mridw 
a  of tht + r h e a n d p o w ~ f d  
a s a p b d ~ f  crathgtbepmmqhbfatIrisdse 
in the seer Futura. 
H w e & & ~ o f ~ ~ b f , f o b e ~  
~ a n d t i a e p l ~ e ~ p e l y t h t ~ f f o ~  
weWill~&followingPiehlrc.~f thethelopmettrof 
~ h t h t p t r i o d & ~ .  , '  
SOWN AWA OF ALL CROPS IN THE USM. 
(In M 1 I h  9 f  H e c h ~ s * )  
1913 1929 1930 1931 1932 
T d  mwn m.. .. 105-0 118.0 127,2 1363 134.4 
Of w w  
a) &ah ... 94.4 96.0 101.8 104.4. IlPJ 1 
b) Tpebnieal mop 4.5 8.8 10.5 l4d 14.9 
' c ) V d l e s  ... 3,8 7.15 84 9.1 92 
a) ~aaatr ....... 2 1  5 6.5 88  LO& 
AREA OF ~ C A L  Q ~ I N  THB W.S&E 
19U 1929 1930 1931 1932 
&m~ ............ 0.69 L J l 6  1.58 2.14 2.12 
lk (long hbce). ... Id2 Id3 1-75 2.39 231 
........ Sugarbe- 0.65 037 1.M 1-35! 1.54 
.......... ; 2.00 S 2 Q  5.22 7.5 7.94 
1) The line af the mal e m  of t h e m .  
' h e i g b 4 ~ h r q ~ f ~ , ~ f d b y t ~  
*A haeran is 2,5 acecs&d. 
, - -  - -  L - --- r- 
whm they drove the kd& from the land, &d the vacated 
land and cultivated it themsrtlm. 
2) The line of departure from the in* 
of the sown area, the h e  of transition from indis-te tx- 
pansion of sown area to the improved cultivation of the land, 
b- to the induction of proper rotation of crops and fallow, - 1  to in- 
I creasing yield and, if &ce shows this tobe necessary, to the i 
1 I ttmponrg diminution a f  rbe sown area. I - - As is known, the second he, the onIy proper k wns p m  . I claimed in 1932, when the rewpktion period in agriculture 
t 
.. was drawing to a dw, and when the question of k d n g  yieId 
be- one of the fundamend qu&ns of the pro- of 
1.' agriculture. 
3 But the &gure.s of tb sown area m o t  be regadd as a .- &eat index of the development of agriculture. &SCB 1 
when AE sown atea inaeases but the output does not, it even 
- dedinea, becauot the cultivation of the soil haa deteriorated and - 
the yield per h e r e  has dedined. In view of tl+ the figura - of the sown area must be supplemented by &tes of the groi3s 
OUQUt. 
Here is the correspnding table: 
GROSS PRODUCTION OF GRAIN AND TECHNICAL 
I CROPS IN THR USSR. 
(IN nsilliolls of centners*) 
h i  1913 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
I, Gtain ... . . .. . . . . . . 801.0 71'1.4 835.4 694.8 6983 898.0 
Carton (raw) . . . . . . 7.4 8.6 11.1. 12.9 12.7 132 . Flax(&r) . . . . . . .  3.3 3.6 4.4 5.5 5.0 5.6 
Sugarbeers . . .  . .  109.0 62.5 140.2 120.5 65.6 W.0 
; Oilseeds . . , . . . . . . .  21.5 3 5 6  36.2 51.0 43.5 46.0 . 
I 
I t  will be sew from this table that the years in which ghe re- 
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- .  
.. . 
organizatiao of agriculave 
weretheyeats inwhich&e~~ 
I t d ~ b b E ~ f P O m ~  
dhkts, in which the .mga&ah af 
a slower pact, &x and ao#oo M y  su
more or lw evenly and Y while main- a 
of deoehpmt 
T M j ,  it will & seen frmn this table that &re were 
m e  being main& 
augax k t  d h k s  whek 
ceded at the mast rapid ra% 
whichwasehebtotnter h e  
thewrstdectineintheh 
tL output droppbd below 
Lastly, it wil l  & seen 
first yen after the 
ndu a turning pint 31 t h e d d a p a t  of p i n  d W e  
d* 
l % a t h s t h a t h n o w o s l w a & ~ m p s ~ a n d  
t h e n w d d c d ~ w i l l f i t m l y a a d d y a d ~ w i t h ~  - f 1 
s t r i b  
I .  It was the B d d x d m g  bmkch&l of @tm that w f F d  . most in the reurphtimpertod The following is tEtc (In mils%# 4 bd) 
1916 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
a)- . . . . . . . . .  35.1 140 302 263 196 166 
b ) L a r g e b e m P d d  58.9 68.1 '32.5 4 40.7 3 M  y 
c) Sh#p md p b .  . 1152 147.2 108.8 ,773 52,1 503. 
7 d ) P i ,  .....,.,,.. Z(w 20.9 13.6 14.4 '116 a; 
This d d e  shows that ia dm perid under r a ~ i e w  ‘b - .  ' ; 
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ttot an improvement, but a toatinued &the, ip the n& of 
lipestock in the country canpaxed with the prewar Id 
atly, the fact that the d h t d i n g  h c h  of agtkdhur wau 
more in the )rands of the big kuW elements and a h  the intense 
kulak agitation for the slaughter of l i d  which found favor- 
able a ~ i I  in the years of rcorgmhtion are dcc tcd  in this table. 
. Furthermore, it foUows from thk table that the decline in 
the mrmbcr of livest& began in the vetpl &st ytar of r e o r e -  
tion (1930) and 'contintled right up to 1933; tbe d m b c  was 
mosr d in the k t  three yam, while in 1933, the frrst year 
afatr the reorganization puiod had closed and when p r o w  
was made in grain crops, the d&e in the n u m k  of liwtock 
reached its *urn. 
Lastly, it follows from this tabk that the meme proe#is has 
alresdy canmad ia pig bratding and that in 1933 tbe s p p  
toma of direct progta wert already obscmd. 
Thiameansthat1934sbauldandmustmatkatutniagpi11t 
wwards progress in all branches of stock bmeding. 
How did the c o ~ t i o o n  of peasant farming dwelop in 
the petiad under review? 
Here i s  the correspndmg dIt: 
rnu.EmrwZATION 
1929 I930 1931 1932 1933 
Number of d d v e  fama 
(in rhousu~ds) . . . . . . . . 57.0 85.9 211.1 211.05 224.5 
Nrrmber of h d d s  in eol- 
~ d v e f a r m s ( i a & o m )  1.0 6.0 13.0 14.9 15.2 
Per mt of co l l c c t id  p u -  
mr hwwhalds . . . . . . . . 3.9 23.6 52.7 61.5 65.0 
And what w u  die movement of the sown area for grain ac- 
ding to-? 
Here is the c o m s p n b g  table: 
?2 

p h  100 per cent deliwed ody 130,000,000 p d s ,  whereas in 
192P3Q the individual pcasaats delivered to thc mte about 780,- 
OW,000 poods whik the ao11e&vc farms d e l i d  not more than 
i20,W,000 p m b i t  will h e  as dear as clear can bt that 
during the perid under rcview the collective farms ad individual 
have d m a g d  mIe; the collective farms during this 
period have become the predomiiting force in &turc, w M t  
~ e i n d i ~ p c a m n t s h a v c ~ t o t h e p o s i t i w o f a m s m d -  
ary force and are compelled to subanit and adapt M v e s  to 
the coIhivt farm system. 
It Itmust be admitted that the toiling -try, our Switt 
pasantry, has completely and irremcab1y come under the red 
Aag of socialism {Prolonged +&we.) 
Let the ! k & I i s t - R e y o l u ~  Mtnshwiks aad bout.$eois 
Trotskyists tell old wives' tale3 about the peasantry being counter- 
revolutionary by their very nature, about & beiag br inod to 
restore capidism in the U.S.S.R., about their inability to serve 
a s & & e 6 0 f t h e ~ ~ ~ i n b u i l & ~ ~ a n d & u t  
it being impossible to build & in the U.S.S&. The facts 
show that these gemIemen are M e r i n g  tk U.S.S,R. and fht 
Soviet p t a m i ~  The fam $low that our Soviet pasantry bas 
put off from the show of capitdim for gaod and are d i g  
f o d  in alliance with the working clasu towards sodaliam. The 
faas show that we have already built the ioutldations of Wit 
&ty in the U.S.S.R. and all we have to do now is to erect the 
c d i f i ~  task which undoubtedly is much easiw than building 
the fomdations of socialist society. 
The in- in the sown area and output are not the only 
. however, that express tht streagsh of the collective farms 
and Soviet f m  It is  e x p d  in the increase in tht num- 
ber of tractors in use, and in the gtowth of mechwhtioa Therc 
ia no doubt that in &a our coi 
forms have made wry m- pgws. 
Here is the cormpnding table: 
NUMBER OF TRACTORS EM 
CULTURE IN THE USSR. 
(Allowmce d e  fm Deprechth) 
1929 1930 I931 I932 
Number of tmtm in t h w r r d  . Tod numbu of tractom.. . . .  34.9 72.1 1253 143.5 M.1 
Of which: 
a) In m.ehint a d  tractor a- 
tioas ................. 2.4 31.1 633 74.8 1223 
b) In %kt farms (all ays- 
tam) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9,7 27.7 51,5 64.0 818 
Porwr in rhousmpds HJ. 
. . .  Tod number of tractors. 391.1 1003.5 1850,O 2225.0 31008 
Of which: 
a) In maehiat and tiam sta- 
tiblLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23.9 3725 848.0 1077.0 17W 
b) In Soviet farms (all s p  
tam) ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123.4 48583.1 892.0 1043.0 131M 
Thus we have 204,000 tr- with a combid pormx of 
3,100,,000 HP. in the eoUcaiw farms and h k t  farms, Aa p u  
m. this is not a small f o r e  it is a force &of DUUQS tiv SL 
one time asa rtmott pmpm. A T  
er of 
and 
MACHIN3 AND TRACTOR STATIONS 
1930 1931 1932 1 c a m b b h ~  (in thowad) 7 ( lmh)  a1 2 2  %tomadengines (intfrorwads) 0.1 4.9 6.2 174 
canph oad SamiampIcx t l d h g  
madha (in d m u d s )  . . . .  2.9 27.8 37.0 50.0 1 
E h d c  bdhtim (in 
u n i ~ )  . .-.. . . , . . . . . . . . .  ,...I68 268 451 1 3  1 
IlepairshopinM.TS.(in&}..lW 770 1220 1933 
M o t a r ~  (intbmn&) ..... 0.2 1 .O 6.0 13.5 
Aw& (in d m )  ......... 17 191 243 2800 
IN SCWlBT FARMS CONTROUEiD BY THB COMMIS- 
S-T FOR S O W  FARMS 
1930 1931 1932 1933 - 
~ a r p . w t e r a  (m bum&) 1.7 6.3 11.9 13.5 , 
Mobrs d Cagines (in &maads) 0.3 0.7 I .2 2.5 
C o m ~ a u d ~ k a t h t e s h i n g  
& (in t f m w a d ) . . . .  1.4 4,2 7.1 8.0 
Elcdc b d a ~  (in dts) ... 42 112 164 222 
R* $flops 
n)Capitalmpajrs(inunics) ..:72 I33 208 302 
b) Medium repairs (in units) . . .  75 I60 215 476 
t) Cumat tep& (iD &) . . (  203 310 578 1166 
Mooor truck (m t fmtwd) .... 2.1 3 -7 6 1  10.9 





politid depxmats  of Soviet fan%& 
Thcsamctbingmwtbe&dinregardtosuppIyhg&d-. - 
1 d V E f a n n t l d S o v i e t f a r m e w i e h n t r r ~ ~ '  . 
m d a p a m k k  bitrwellknownfhPfidwrhgthepdd. 
- ~ ~ , ~ 1 0 r c t b a t l 1 1 1 , Q o o ~ ~ ~ k t t l l o f  this=-wem' - 
s€nt into -tlm 
Duthg the periad utrdu reriw, over 1,900,000 tractor* 
combirae drim drim and &ufEeua were mined and 
stnt to rhc faml un& the control of the & l l m h & h  I 
!hh Fatms A n t  
~ d o n e d i t ~ l y c o u l d t o h d p t b t  
the Gnmkarkt for A+ltute and of tbe 
6a it b said that rfte k use haa k e n  sllade of b e  
. . L P d  than other with the h of barresu- 
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who disobey the instrmiom and the ordets of tk leading Ma, 
and to promoting k t  and comxientious workers. 
One would think that the existence of an enormous a& 
of tramre and machines w d  i m p  the obliitiw u p  the 
land d-em to keep thee vduable machines in good con- 1 dition, to get timely repairs done to them, to employ them in a 
mare or Ias tolerable manner. But what do thy do in this ra 
spect? Unfortunately very Iittle. The maintenance of ttamrs 
and madines is un5atiefaw. Repaim are also ~~at is factoty ,  
because wen to this day thae people refuse to understand that 
the basis of repairs is current and medium repairs, and not capi- a 
td repairs. In regard to the A t i w  of mctors and tnadrines, i 
the hetisfrctory pidon in this respect Lro dear and well 
known that it needs no prcrof. 4 
One of the immediate tasks of agriculture is to introduce j 
proper rotation of mom the memion of clean fallow, and the 
imptowmat of seeds in all branches of agriculture. What is lx- 
ing done in this sphere? Unfortunately, very lit& as yet. Affairs 
in regard to grain and cotton seed ate so anfused that it will 
cake a long time to disentangh t b .  
One of the most e#ebive means of in-hg the yield of 
bn*al crops is  to incrcur the supply of feniliun. What is j &mg done in this sphere? Very little as yet. Fertilizers are avail- i 
able, but the Gnmbarkt: for Agriculture is not able to get 
them, and when it does get them it dm not take the trouble to 
m d  them in time to the places where they are required, and to 
get them utilized properly. 
In regard to Soviet farms, it must be said rhat thy st# fail 
estimate the great woIuti&g sip;nihcsmee of our Soviet farms. 
I 
to cop with their tasks properly. T do not in the Ieast under- 
i But if we compare the enormous sums the state has invested in 1 
. Soviet grain farma are too unwieldy; the direaolri cannot manage 
such huge farms. The Soviet farms are too speclali%cr2 tbey 
I have no rotation of crops and fallow land, they have M r i d  
tlrmwt in them. A p p a t I y ,  it will be n- to qlit up the 
Soviet farms and make them less s p e c d k d  Perhaps yw dink 
that the Cammiwarkt for Soviet Farms opportme1y raised d& 
question and found a solution for it. But it is not so. The ques- 
tion was r a i d  and solved on the initiative of people who had xw 
connection with the Commissariat for Soviet Farms. 
I I 
Finally, there is the question of stock-raking. 1 haw abdp 
reported on the serious livesrock situatioa One w w l d  have 
thought that our Land Dcparemea~ would have displayed fcmr- 
ish activity in the ef ore to abolish tht livestuck &is, would 
have raised the alarm, would haw maddid the workem to & 
our livest& pb Iem by stwm, as it were. Uafortmady, 
nothing of the kid happed,  or is happenin%. Not only have 
they failed to raise the alarm abut the &UP livestock sim- 
tion, but, on the conttaty, they try to gloss over the qutation 
and sometimes in thtir repom they eoen try to mud from the 
public opinion of the country the rtal state of agairs in rcgd 
to livest& which is an impmhib le  thing for Bol&viks to 
do. To hope, after thi that the Land Departtaents will be 
able to bring stack-raising out onto the h i d  and taist it 
to its proper Ievel would be building on d The whole Porty, 
all our workers, Party and non-Party, must take tbt problem 
of st&-raising in hand, bearing in mind that today the prob- 
lem of stock-raising is as urgent as the grain p- 
successfully s d v e k  yesterday. It need not k p o d  
that Soviet raen and w m e n  who have stotmed more ttsati one 
h d t .  (Loud #p&Usc.) 
Such M the brief and far from complete list of defects which 
must k removed, and the list of t& which mwt be fulftlled 
ia the neat h. 
But t h e  tasks do not exhaust the whole subject. h are 
other & in agriculture ancming which a few words must 
Fmof all, we muat beat in mind that the oId division of our 
regions into i n d d  regha and agrarian regions has now b 
come bk Wt tso longer have regions which are d & l y  
a p r h ,  WU w o d  supply grain, meat and v e g d l e s  to the 1 h d 4  +; nor have we adusivdy i n d d  reg- which 
I a n  dculatt w &Ping all theneaeaaarysupptiesfromotherre- 
gions. Development is p m c d q  towards &e pasitida when d our 
regiwrs will Ix more or laa industrial, and as this de~ehpent 
I 
+ they will become more and more i n d d .  Thin means 
that & Ukraint, the North Caucasus, the Central Black Soil 
Region, and other formerly agrarian disttias can no longer sup 
ply the industrial centers with as much produce as they supplied 
ia the past, k t l s e  now they have to feed their own tom and 
thcir own w o & ~  the n u m b  of which ppill W. But from 
this it follows that wety region will hsvt tc develop its own ag- 
rinJturd base in order to bt able to supply k 1 f  with vegetablcg 
potatoes, butter and,milk, and to some degree with vain and 
, meat, if it doa not want to get into &mIties. You know that 
thi4 is quite praaiatble, ad is King done now. 
T h e d i b t o p u m u t h i S I i n e t o t h e e n d a t d ~  
. P u ~ o r t ,  amtion should be paid to the fact that the 
d-known division of out regions into d g  regions and 
d u b  r+ns is alp0 beginning to lose im exdusive charmer, - - 
Thb yrrr "consuming" &ons like the MOSCOW and  GO*^ 
zone there are abut  
Evidently the ask i to form huge tmcu of grain craps in tht 
rziattiets in the cmsumiag zone. 
~~ for the casm districts af the T m V o l p  As' you 
- h o w ,  h i s  work has ken cornmeneed a h d p ~  dhqh it ammet 
bedthat i t i sbdngcarr icdonwith~mtintens i ty .  Inre  . 
gard to the kigabu of the TmiwVdga -d this is tibt 
3. Tm IMFWDYBMENT IN THE MATERIAL Commg~s 
AND IN THE CULTUBEI OF m T a m  
To s u m  up, we have: 
agriculture; the d h  system has bbMmt the soIe system in 
the whole of national emnomy, and thc capitalist b e n u  have 
been forced our of all sph- of national c a m m y .  
(c) The fiaat abandonment by the ovwhetaing majority of 
the individual pasants of smafl commodity individual emnomy, 
their organization in collective farms on the basis of colltaive 
labar and the mllective ownership of the means of production, 
the complete victory of eolleetive farming over small commodity 
(d) The growing p- of expansion of collective fa*ms at 
the expense of individual peasant farma, as a consequence of 
which their number h diminishing month by month, and t h y  are, 
in fact, being transformed into an auxiliaty force for the coIlac- 
rive farms and Soviet farms. 
- - >  - 
-g  9- **-k.L,!-z* , . 4 '* 
m d p a n t i E f d f t l s m + h  T h e ~ ~ ~ $ s c  
+ters oat of the labor of the m k  now tm& 6 
dit hands of the milem and are used patcIp for the p w  of 
' t r a & g + 0 ~ ~ m d h d i & g ~ d c t a ~ 4  
workerrs in industry, and partly for the of M p  h-
e tht incoma of the workers and psmk 
Unemplapetlt, that sesurge of the working class, has & 
, a ~ I n d w b o u r g s o i a c n u a t r i ~ m i n i n t u o f ~ m  
- -  in want: and rn- owing to the lack of work. But in ow 
~ountrythereartnofotlewanyderswbIa&w&d~ 
# Wih the of kdak b+, poverty in 
, rUFPl distrhl ha &a& nvey c o l k b e  famtr  
or individual farmtr, aow has the qmtmity of cnjoyiq a 
human existence, if only he wants to work M y  a d not to be '. a loafer, a tramp and a dtqmilet of ~Uccdvc  farm pmperty. 
The aMition of +EP* rheobolition of unem- ' in the mwm a d  the abolition of pwng in the counng.id* on 
' historic h t s  in the material conditions of the & 
&utdichthtworkmandpamnts,eveninthemosttcdmnu- 
mud' bout* coutl#irs dare mi drePm. 
Theveryqpmmccof o u c l a r g e ~ a n d i n d d c e n t e r s  
. has changed The inwidh hahark of the big towns in bout- 
+ C w m h  are the d m  the fmdled wo&ng daa districts 
on the outsldtts of the twvn, which teptearent a heap of dark 
damp, iP the majority of msut, cellardwellings, in a semi*- 
dated condition, where . d y  the poor live in fdth aud cum 
their faa. The mlution in the U.S.SR has swept away the 
&ma in ow country1 Thdr p h  has betn taken by dWt 
~ b r i & ~ ~ ' d i s # i e t s a r t d i n m a n y ~ t h e ~ c b  
dit&rs of out towns arc better built than the central d h k  
The appe;uat;ce of our villaget has chin& even more. Tk 
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with the best bum for the the priwt and the 
k u k  in the foreground and with the semi-dilapidated huts of 
t h r p e a a a n t s i n & e b P ~ d , i s ~ t o ~ . I b  
place ia being taken by the new &ge with its public buildings, 
its dub, radio, cinema, sdroo4 library, QOChq with itt~ t r a m  
d m e j  threshinq machines and automabites. The oId i m p  
rant personages of the villa- the kulaksrtploitet, the blood- 
&g usurer, tk pmftteering meTcbant, the lit& fathe+ 
mas, have dkppared- Now, the prominent perrwnases of the 
village are tk lea&g workers in the &YC farms and Soviet 
fatms, ia the &Is and d& the head tractor and combine 
biver, the leachg mea and women in tbc f el& and in the stock. 
raising f a r q  and the ht dm& brigade workers on &t calk- 
tive fam fields. 
ThsntirhuLbeovea m v o d c o u n t r y H ~  
The p s a n ~  are ceasing m regard the town as the center of rheir 
apIoitatioa The ties of hbe economic aad c u l d  M be- 
town and eomtry are k d n g  stronger. The village now re- 
ceives assktance fm the turn in the shapt of tractors, apkd- 
tural machinery, automobiles, works arrd h;i& And tvtn the 
d a g e  itself now has its own industry in the shape of At ma- 
chiae and tractor station%, repair shops, d som of &we farm 
i n ~ u n d t t r a l t i a g s , s m a l I e l e a k p o w e r m ~ e t c .  The 
d d  @If betweexr and counttg is bcjng bridged. 
Such arc the maio achitvements of the toilers in the sphere 
of impwing their material conditions, their everyday lift and 
cultuie. 
On the basis of thme achievements we have the f o h h g  to 
m o d  for the peridd under review: 
(a) An inamie in the rvQcnl income ham ~~,W,OMI,CW 
rubles in 1930 to 50,q000,000 rubles in 1933, and in view of 
the fact that the h e  of the a p i d t  elements, induding con- 
4 .  ~ a t t k p r t e c n t t ; m e ~ k t b a n ~  
writ, aImm the whde of the natimraI hmme t 
mong the workers, & emplopts and d i n g  
co-opemtivc sodetia and tbt moe. 
(b) ~n inertase in tht &tionof the Sovietur 
160,5~WOntthemd of 1930 m iQa,OOO,MKl u the md of 19331 
(c) An in- in the wmbef of & and 
phyees fmm 14,530,,000 in 1930 m 21,883,000 in 1933 
bet of workers ernploymi at manual labor M 
p e r i d  from 9,489,000 to 13,797,000, the numbet of wor 
ploycd in k r g d t  indusq, indudkg 
5,079,oaO to 6,882,000, the n d w  of 
4 ftom 1,426,000 to 2,519,000 
(d) The wages fund of the workers and & 
d fmn 13,547,OOa,OW mbb in 1930 m 34,280, 
mrubh in 1933. 
-* (e) An in- itl th average annual wagm of 
wrkers fromWirubl t sh1930toI ,~I9rub~in~933 .  i 3 
' (f) An iaacaa t in thed insuranafrcadfoc&d~  
* (8) The adoption of a --hour day in tbc whole of i n d 4  
working on the wrfaee. 
(h) State to the pasantry in thc fom of 2, id! 
marrhinl? and tractor stleione and the iawmwt of 2,~000,000 
&lea in this. 
. (i) SWC aid to the pcamnm in the form of d~ to 
' m M v e  famu amouhting to 1,600,ODO,000 rubk 
(j) State aid to the pasanmy in the fom of 4 and 4 
7 h a s  amounting in tht petid under review, to 262,000,000 
pods of grain. 
(k) State aid to p r  peasants in the shape of complete or 
partial exemptions from taxation and insurance paymenu 
amomthg to 370,000,000 rubles. 
In the sphere of the cultural deveIopment of the country in the 
period under review we have the fobwing: 
(a) The introduction throughout the U.S.S.R. of universal 
compuBory eIemenrary dumb and an increase of literacy 
'among tk population from 67 per cent at t h e  end of 1930 to 90 
pt cent at the end of 1933. 
(b) An increase in the number attending schools of all gradas 
from 14,354000 in 1929 to 26,419,000 in 1933. Of t h e  the 
number receiving elementmy education increased from 11,697,000 
to 19,163,000; middie schooi education increased from 2,453,000 
to 6,674,000, and h i g h  education increased frwn 207,000 to 
491,000. 
(c) An inetease in the number of children teceiving pre 
school education from 838,000 in I929 to 5,917,000 in 1933. 
Id) An incrca~ in the number of higher educational e d  
lishments, generaf and special, from 91 units in 1914 to 600 
units in 1933. 
(e) An increase in the numbet of scientific mearch institutes 
from 400 units in 1929 to 840 units in 1933. 
(f) An increuc in the number of dub bsritutu'frorn 32,000 
in 1929 to 54,000 in 1933. 
(g) An inaease in the number of cinema theatres, cinema 
insdlations in dubs, and travelling cinemas, from 9,800 units 
in I929 to 29,200 units in 1933. 
(i) An k a s e  in the circuIation of newspapers from 12,- . 
5 W , W  in 1929 to 36,500,000 in f 933. 
It would not be amiss to point out that the number of work- 
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F' N 
c m p r n o n g t h e s & t s i n o u c h i g h ~ e d d ~  - -  
m ~ a r  51.4puoestof the& and that of d b q m  
w o ~ ~ a m o n g t h e ~ i n h i g a e r e d u c a ~  
ia 1932-33 was only 3.2 per cmt, and that of 
2-4 pr cent 
Wtmmnote~lpplmhgfa~tpndpsanh&h~ftZ# - 
growth of culture in the the growth of activity of ~ I C  
W u m m ~ v t f ~ i m m i n d o r ~ w o r k .  Itiswell - 
~ f m ~ p k , t h a t a b o u t ~ o O o a ~ l m t n a r t ~ a f  
c o l l e a i # f a r m s . ~ t h p n ~ 0 0 0 a r t m e m b e t s o f ~ t  
k d s  of dloetive f q  24000 are foremea, t00,m am group 
wgmkq 9,m p mamge~ of collective dairy fauna stld 
.?,om ;art traceas dri- N& to say, the= flguw are art- 
kPlete, but even b e  are &t m indbte the enomnous 
~ a f c u l ~ i n t b e r u r a t d 5 s ~ .  bra&thkfaahas  
casmms +ihncet. It ki hascnormotw sigpiklmm beeauac p' 
womw repfw#nt Mf th pop&tion of the COUtltFy* theyreprmcnt .';I 
~ ~ u s a r m y o f I a b o r a d t h e i r & b t o b r i n g u p o w  
d b n ,  out future ~~ rhat is to say, out f w  Thst 
i s s h V w e m u s t n o t p e d t &  huge army of d m  to remrsb 
in d a t b  and ignorance! That is why we must welcome tht 
~ s o c i a l p a i p i t y o f o u t  oiling women andthdtpmob  
t ~ l t a d i n g ~ ~ ~ t u l ~ i a d i ~ a t i ~ n ~ f  tbc&Mwth~f OW -i 
atthue. (Prolonged &awe.) -
Finally, we must pint to one mstt fact, but of a ntptivc 
cfsmcm, I have in mind tht intolerable fact that our &a&- 
d a n d m & n W t i e s n a r e s t i l l & 1 4 T h i s i s a ~ &  
feet W e r i n g  on the d t i o n  of the interem of the m Wi. 
puratmmw &dtf8eewithoutfai l ,and&~thisisdoec 
rf# h* 
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4. IMPROVEMENT m COMMODITY C~~CULATION 
AND TBANSPORT 
Thus we have the foIlowing: 
(a) An inaeased output of m a n u f d  go& induding 
articles of general cwrs;um+; 
(6) An k e d  output of agrieuIturaI produce; 
(c) An in- in the nequircmeats of and demand for pro- 
duce and m u f a c t a d  goods by the toiling m s ~  of town and 
country. 
'OVhat is still required in order to complete the circle of t k  
cooaditions and for the masm of consumers the 
manufactured goods and prod-? 
b e  comrades &I& that the mtre exiatma of thw mdi- 
donst s&dent for&cm&li feo f&col~t layboW 
like a spring. They are profoundly n h h  Wt cpa hna&m 
an thee condiaons existing, but if the pads do not get #r the 
mnsumer, economic lift will not only not bubble like a spring but 
~ t h t c o n t m y i t w i l I b t d i s l o ~ a t e d a u d ~ d r i g h t ~ k a  
very foundations. It is hi@ & we did tbat in the last 
analysis goods are p r o d 1 4  not for the sake of producing ttbem 
, but m.he consumed. C h s  have occurred when we have had a 
fair quantity of g d s  and pro& but h e  not only did not 
r e d  the coasumee but for yeata pasid Jdwards and for- 
wards in the bureaueratic &atem of our d L t d  d t y  
distribution system, out of reach of tbc consumers. It gots with- 
out =fig that under thtse &nuns- industry and agricul- 
ture lost alI stimulus to W produaion; the commodity db 
&n centets b e  con$esred with goods, w& the workers 
and p s a n t s  had to go without thun. The mdt H l e  
&n of the economic lift of the country notwithstanding tht 
fact that g o d  and pMduct were avaitab1c In a& that the 
+ t m & c  lift of the country might Wit lilce s s p h q  and h a t  
5 8  
ahugenmmrkofgoode~+andotores. Tbert-b 
o ~ ~ O f + ~ t E B e ~ o f ~ b  
& m i s m r r . f r m n t h c ~ m t b c ~ .  ~ h c -  
r t a d i a g s y s e e m , r h e ~ t i p e t d h g ~ t h e I o e s l . i n d ~  -* the mkive farms and the individual peasants muat ZII: - 
d r p w n i n t o & ~  
the Communb an tht queatlotr . 
not realize that Soviet trade is our own Bolshevik b u s k q  and 
that the workers employed in wade, including workers behiid the 
c o u n t m h t  is if they work b e s c l ~  vehicles of our revo- 
lutionotp Bo&& awe. (Applrw~scJ It $oes w i h t  ayhg 
chat the Party had to give a slight shaktng up to h e  Commu- 
nis+ if they may k called that, and throw their aristocratic 
prejudi- into the dus&m (Prolonged appldsrse.) 
Then we had to overcome prejudicesr of another kind. I refer 
to the "Leftist" chattu that has gained nutency among another 
seedon of our wokm about Sovief trade being a a u p d d  
stage, h u t  it h g  necessary now to organizt the direct inter- 
change of pmducrs, &ut money being abolished soon because 
it fw b c m e  transformed into mere tokens, about it k g  uxr- 
nacessary to dewlop trade since the direct interchange of prod- 
ucts is hocking at the door. It must be observed that thia 
"Leftist" pertybourgeois chamr, wh'ih pIays into the hands of 
rbe capitalist ekments who are striving to prevent the expansion 
of soviet trade, has not only gaiaed currency among a certain 
seetion of Red Professors, but also among certain workers en- 
gaged in trade. Of course, it b ~ D U S  and funny to think 
that these people who are incapable of orgaoizmg the very simple 
matter of Soviet trade are chattering about their A to 
o r e  a far more oomphcattd and di&L matter like the 
direct interchange of products. But Don W t e  wai quixotic 
precisely because he lacked the most eIemenraty appreciation of 
the practieai afairs of life. These people, yho ak as far moved 
fmmMarxismasheavenis fwmeareb,cvidemly donotrealizt 
that we dud have money for a long time yet, right up to the time 
until the first stage of communism, i.e., until the &&st atnge 
of development has becn accompiphed. They do not mdk that 
money is the instrument of boutgeois economy which the Sdvitt 
government took over and adapted to the iarerest~ of socialism 
~ t h e p u r p o s e o f ~ S w i e t d c o ~ u f m a e g d m  
tingthemdtiomforthtkhtedqeaf -They 
nosreakthatdlein-of+tseanreplpee,dbe j 
& result bf a perfectly or&d ryseem of Wet t& of 
-&wehsoenotatc=a9~andartnotlikelymhamfot.  
*- rime. It goes without saying that our Psa~, in trying to or- 
~ & n e ~ d e d S ~ v i e t s i l d e , f o u n c l i t ~ t o g i v e a d t k r b .  
.lhg to thae %ft" m o n s t d t b  and to scatter their p t t y  k- 
 tothe he winds. 
Furthermore, we had to overcome an &thy Wt of tbc 
-workers engaged in trade of &&dFlg goods m c h d d y ,  11 
"to abolish their neglect of tht dtmand for aswrtments and of 
requiremeats of tht eonsumem, to abolish the medxmical de- 
-6verp of 6 +&tion in m&. For this p q m ~ ,  
regional and h t d s t r b  g o d  ba, and tens of &usaads of: 
new ghops and stom were opened 
Furthermomq we bad to kguidate the tnonopdy of the a 
qeratiwsiathematket. I n t h i s ~ e c t i w w e i t l s d d t h e  
~ t s t o ~ ~ n m e n c e ~ g i n & o a m g w d a , s n d t h e  
' t fot Suppkw was iasauaed to develop an extensive 
r w d  produa. On the one hand thL led, m the $3 
impvemetlt of q r a t i v e  trade as a result of campctitbn; on 
theotherhand,it l e d t o a r e d u a i w r i n ~ i n t h e ~ k e t , t o  
the market king p in a sounder condition. 
A wide network of dining rooms was established which pro- -+A 
, wide food at reduced pricesl rpublic catering'') ; q o h '  Sup- 
ply W t s  (ORS.) were fxddaed in s6e -and 
d those who had no mmcdorr with the f m c q  were d m  off 
1 tbe supply list; in & factork under the control of the Canmb 
Wt for Heavy I n d u s q  alone 500,000 permu had to bt ts. 
-,d from the list. 
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term credit bank with u 0 0  distria braaehcs capable of ham- 
ing rommercial operatiom 
Aa a result of these we have in the ~eriod under 
review: 
(a) An in- in the n& of $wps and stores from 184,- 
662 uaib in 1930 to 277,974 units in 1933; 
(b) A newly mated network of regional goods bases num- 
bering 1,011 units, and inm-diseria goods basu numbering 864 
d t s ;  
(c) .A newly crated network of Workers' Supply Depart- 
ments aumbering 1,600 units; 
(d) An increase in the number of commerdeI stores for the 
aaIt of bread io 330 towns; 
(e) An in- in the number of public d i q  rooms, whih 
at the present titlle mter for 19,800,000 ~~; 
(f) An increase in state and mqicrative trade, including 
that of public rlinitlp rooms, from 18,9QC#,000 nrbh in 1930 . 
to 49,000,000,000 rubies in 1933. 
It wouId h a mistake, however, to think that this expansion 
of Soviet trade is dc ien t  to satisfy the requirements of our 
economy. On the contrary, it has now become more dear than 
ever that tht present state of c o d t y  cir& cannot sat* 
bfy our raquiremenar. Henct, the task is to develop Soviet trade 
stilI further, to dtaw Id industry into it, to iamac mlledive 
farm p#tsant trade, and to a& new and decisive s u e m a  in 
the sphere of inaeasiag Soviet trade. 
It must be pointed out, how- Dhat we caanot restrict our- 
selves merely m expanding Soviet mde. If the development of 
wr economy depn& upon the dewlopent of mtmdty &a- 
Iation, upon the dwefopment of Soviet trade, then the develop- 
ment of Soviet trade, in its turn, depends upon the dwelopmwt 
bf our trampon system, railways and w a t t m a y s  and a h  aut* 
~PPbiehmay~useahit&and+gmLhdy @a 
& in the wbIe d our economy, + d l y  ib tht sphat of ' , 
&dim drCUIPtiw. a - -  
i tLtmetbpt&rdway*MmhuindaKdiDfni&t . 
rwer from 133,~(304000 t o n h t e m  in 1930 to U& 
mW toa-Mmchts in 1933- &t this is too lit&, far tm 
e for tq for ow economy. 
a 45,600,000,QOO in I930 to ~9,900,000,060 
k h e r e r s  in 1933. 3ut thia k tso fit&, 6at.m for out 
q- 
I wiiI not dial with automobile in which the nlrm. 
' 0 f a u d  ( t d u a t a d ~ c a r s )  itlaad& 
10 in 1913 to l17,m rrt tht tnd af 1933. ?%in ia m iaade- 
a f o r ~ u r ~ ~ y t h a t o n e b ~ r o ~  
~ ~ c . n s ~ t b e ~ d o v b t b t b r r ~ ~ l h a c f o r r m o f ~  . * 
d d e p e r m r m f c h h i f t E r e ~ r t s y e t e m d i d n ; o t  
~ f F o m a a e r d n d h s a s c e a W b w w m a d c - t r ~ & ~  
h ~ - ~ e t l a c , i ~ ~ m h @ q t h e ~ ~  
b y p r w i c t i a g ~ h p t l d ~ t h e t a a k ; i s m ~ t h i s .  
awatic routine a t t i 6  in the a dmhb&ve- 
'kmafce them.inore &&at. 
*pad-, we have din w i n g  the a c r e  ~IutbmU 
e h e m a k p m b o f  bdwtry, andindustryiaraowstdkq 
~ o m i ~ ~ f e a . W e h v e & s u d h ~ & t b e e o l u ~  
~ - ~ p r o b l r m s o f ~ ~ a n d w e ~ w y ~ q u i t c ~  -: 
that agriculture b now also standing My on its htt. 3ut we 
are in danger of losing all these achievements if any hitch occuts 
in commodity &&tion, and if tramprt turns out ro be a fmer 
an our Iegs. Henee, the tapk of expanding d t y  eimJa- 
tion and of decisively improving transport is the immdiatt and 
urgent problem, and, u n k  this problem is mlved, further p g -  
rcss will be-impdble. 
Z come naw ro tht q u d n  of the Party. 
Tht pmmt Gngrem is taking p k  under the flag of dxe 
cmpIete victory of Lenhah~ un& the hg of the lhpdathn 
of tht mamats of anti-- group. 
The antitiLenink Tdyist  group has bem defeated and 
,mtred Its o r g a b s  ate now around the ba&+ 
,o# the bourgeois parties abtoad 
The antitihi& wt dwiationist group has bcen & f e d  
.dgcateeredItsofganizersIong*xeno~thcirvitwsd 
-am now trying very hard to +te the sins they cPmmittsd 
'against the Patty. 
Thc nathd kiationist pupa haw k a  &fad a d  
&#ad, T h e i r o r g a t l i w r s l o f f g ~ ~ h n s r l l y m ~ w i t h  
she interventionist emi&r;;s, or else have m a e d  
The msjoriv of the a d b w  of these anti-mlurionq 
p u p s  have been ~~fnpdled to admit that the Jiue of the Party 
was right a d  haw cawd before dx P q .  
At the Ftfemth Partp Congress it wss stiU n#;cssary t o p  
'dmt the Party line was tightandm wages& a .  ctp 
6 snti-I;eahist p u p ;  ancI at the Shtemth Patry Gngma 
.& hast adherents of these gmtp bad to be +add, At this 
~ ~ b n ~ , e h e t e i s m ~ t o p r o v e a n d , p e r ~ 8 o ~  
;m beat. Everyone now sea tht the line of the Pettp has COP- 
,+ (Ma**) 
The poky of industdbhg tht country has a q m t d  &a 
~~artobvioustoewryotlt .  Whatargumentcanbep44  
Ta@imt thiu fact? 
t argument can be advand a p b t  that fact? I 
The exptrieact of our country has shown that it is quite p 
sible to btddsodalism in a single couutry taken separately. What  
argument GUY bt advanced against that fact? 
Evidently, afl t h e  s u m ,  and ptimarily the victory of the 
F I V B Y ~  Plan, have utterly demoralized and d e d  to atoms 
dl and mrndry attti-Laidst - It must be admitted that the Party today is as united as it 
never hias becn btfore. (loud, prolonged applause.) 
1. PROBLEMS OF IDEDLOGICAL-Porn- LwERSHIP 
Does this mean, however, that the fight is ended and that the 
f d c r  offensive of mciilirm is to bt abandoned as something 
No, it dots not mean that. 
that m a  that d is well in the Party, that thm will be 
no more deviations and that we can now rest on our IaueIs? 
No, it does not mean that. 
The enemies of the Parry, the o p p o ~ t s  of all shades, the 
aationaI&- of all typts, have been defeated. But rm-  
nants of thtir i&Iagiea d live in tk minds of individual mem- 
bers of tbe Party, and not infrequently rhey find expmhn. The 
Parry must not bt regarded as mething isoIaeed from the people - who surround it. It liwa Pnd & in its environment. I t  is not 
nwp&hg that not h+dy unhdthy moods pwmate rhe 
Party from without. And the soil for such mads undoubtsdly , 
st i l l  exists in our country, if only for the reason that certain inter- . 
of rfme f m b d  & in 
meat of 6e Second Fiveyear Plan ia 
of + t a l k  in economy 
h f u t e l y  correct ik 
op#ewne aII the 
m o t  YY'that. Still Lr mran 
rot have -me tk surviv& of a p i t a b  in the minde of 
Tfiis cannot k not onIy h u s e  the developat af dm 
mind of man lags behind his ecx~mmic pition, but a h  . 
the capidkt envirronmtat cab, which &ts to revive and aupewr 
the aurvid of mpitalism in economy and in the miPds sf & 
s keep our powder dry. 
It Without =fig thst f h e ~ e  8WVi~ah but UX&C 
favorable mi1 for the revival of the ideofogy of the defwecd 
anti-hhist group in the dhds of individual members of 
Party, Add to this the not very high t h d  Itvel of the ma- 
jority of the members of wr Party, the weak ideological work of 
the Party organa and che fact that out Party w o r k  are wtp 
' burdmed with pracdcal w o k  which deQrivcs tham of 
the oppmtdty of aupa t ing  their &or& b* a d  
yau wiU understand w k  mmes the mnfwioa oa a number 
of problems of Leninism that mists in .the minds of individual 
members of tht Party, which not infrequently mts out 
prm, and whicb htIps to revive the survivab of the ideology of 
the defcaatd anti-Lahist groups. 
That is why we eannot say that the fight is ended, and thpt 
&ere is no longet any need for the policy of tbc & & o f d m  
A number of problems of 
mate how renlcio 
: ptlti-kninkt group are in 
Take for example the q u k  of building a clp~sIcss ocialist 
society. The Seventeenth Party Conferen= & l a d  that we 
are marching towards classleas &t &ty. 1 t - p ~  without 
saying that classless society c;uutot come by itself. It has to be 
won and built by the eflrts of alI the toilers, by stmngchening 
the organs of the dimtorship of the pmlemriae, by extending the 
class struggle, by abolishing cIasses, by Iiquidating rhe remnants 
of the capitalist classes in battles with the enemy, both internal 
aad externd 
The thing is dtar, one would think. 
And yet, who dws not know that the ptomdgation of this 
clear and elementary thesis of Leninism has given rise to not a 
little confusion and unhealthy moods among a certain seaion of 
Party members? The thesis-advanced as a slogan-hout out 
advancing towards h l w  + is interpreted by them as a 
spontaneous process. And they begin to mason in the following 
way: if it is cla~~less o&+ then we can relax the class q k ,  
we ean relax the diaatotship of the pxoletariat and generally 
abolish the state, which in any ase has got to die out soon. And 
they dmp into a state of moonelf eatasy in the expcctadop1 
that soon there will bt no k and therefore no c h s  sttuggle, 
and therefore no 'cares and worries, and therefore it L possible to 
lay down out atnu3 and.retir-o sleep and to wait for the ad- 
vent of d a s h  society. (Laughter.) 
There a n  be no doubt that thig confusion of mind and these 
moods are as like as two peas to the well-known vim of the 
Right deviationbra who beliewd that the old must automatidy 
grow into the new, and that one fine day we shaII wake up and 
find ourselves in mdist society. 
As y o u  see, the remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti- 
Leninist groups can be revived, and have not kt thew wnaaty ' 
by a long way. 
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the cwamunt, d i k e  the &s of an atttl, did not d y  
-&wn domatic froday, armall Iivwto& a oowj mine grim m'r 
ktchgada T h & ~ t h a t h t h t ~ t m e t b e p d  
h e  l a m  la the pursuit of ptotlr bout'+ qua&- It 
g a r ~ t & y i n g t h . t t b l s i r t h e h e l v t . l i u t £ c f t h r -  I '  
t h ~ i s m ~ b a d i a ~ b e c a ~ t b e s o r m d ~ r O p m ~ t ~ f  rhe 
mass collBcrive farm movement demands this. 
This dws not mmu, of wurst, that the commune ia not 
noaded at all, rhat it docs not repiwent the highwt fotm of the 
mll&ve farm mowntnt. No, the mmmune ia needed, and, of 
course, it is the hi#w form of the collective farm movrment. 
Bur tbis appfiei, not to tk pmmc ammme, which a r o ~  on the 
hais of undevehpd technique and of a h i t a g e  of prod- 
and which is itself pasing to the position of the arteJ, but to the 
commune of rbe future which will arise on the hiis of a more 
developed technique and of an abundance of p d c t s .  The 
porsent agtieuItud commune a~lse on the b d i  of an under- 
developed technique and shortage of produaa Thw, ptoperly 
+g explains why it praetied equal;- and showed 
little concern for the p r m d  everyday interests of its members, 
as a result of.which it is now b t ' i  compelled to pass to the pi- 
don of the a d ,  in which the pmd and pubIic interests of the 
collmive fmers are m u d d y  a n b i d  Tht future ammune 
wil l  arise out of the d d o p d  and well-to-do a d s .  The future 
agricultural commuue will arise when the &Ids and fanns of the 
areel wil l  be replete with grain, with at&, with p~ultry, with 
vegetabIcs, and all other produce; when the artels will have tk'i 
m & m i d  laundries, dhmg rooms, bakeries, etc.; when 
rbe e o ~ c b v e  farmer will IMX that it-is more to hin advantap;t to 
receive his meat and milk from the f a m  than to haw his own 
cow and smalI I i v t s t d ;  when the woman collective famer will 
see that it is more to her advantage to take her meals in a dining 
room, to ger her bcead from the public bakery and to get her 
linen washed in the public laundry than to prepare all these 
things herself. The future commune wilI arise on the basis of a 
mDie developed technique and of a more developed artel, on the 
basis of an abundance of produe When will that be? Not 
, And pq among a staioa of the members of 
di had retreated from 
.question a t iwwhy?  Bccausc, it a m  there is 
i a t h e ~ ~ ~ ~ t d i & r e n # s i n t h e ~ t ~  
p e d  life is a piece of m c h a t y  
tMS that all people s l t d  live thd, individual Iiw in the same I 
way. And hally, arc not difFuqms in requirements arid in 
ptrswal life pnsemd among the wo&rs? Does that mean '- 
the &afcmoretwnote frmnsocialismdxmthcmern-8 
rs of an agricultural commune? 
Thee people evidently think that kalism calls for equality, ' 
for levelling the requirements and the lives of the m a -  
of d t y .  N& to say, such an assumption has nothing 
with MulLm, with Lttlinh. By quality Wkn 
means, not equality in petsod q u k u e n w  a d  personal life,, 
tbut the ahlidon of dasses, i ,e, (a) the qua1 mamipation of' I I 
all & from exploiration after the m p i h  tram k n  0ver-r 
thrown and expmpriated, (b) the equal abolition for all of1 
private property in the means of production after they have k n i  
tr~asformed into the pmperty of the whole of society, (c) dm 
equal duty of aii to work according to their ability and the! 
=equal right of all t o h s  to receive according to the amount of , 
work they bave done (sotirJist mdety), (d) the eqwl duty 06 ' 
alI to work according to heir ability and the equal right of d I 
toilers to receive according to their requknents (communist 
d t y ) .  And Marxism atarts out with the assumption tha6 
people's tastes and requLemu1ts are not, and cannot be, equal 
in quality or in quantity, tither in the period of socialism ot ini I 
the period of r o m t n h  
That h the Marxian conception of equality. 
M& has not tecog&cd, nor doe  it recognize, any other 
To draw from this the d w h  that raLlLn aid fo; 
equality, for the kvelling of the requirements of the munbers of 
&ty, for the Ievelkag of thcir rastes and of theit. ptrsosal 
liw that according to Matxism all should w=r the same dothea, 
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~ z s ~ h u u s c i t m c h s d ~ u n i w P 1 d  
in ia awdest form," In bia Mr. QuhrirPg Rev+ 
Engels h t e a  a ~ I c  chapttr to the 
- m d a - e n p +  
puhneemmuntcnaMMun&aIh.Aad~Lwmtm 
h e  i n t d d  ( L a d s  speech, On Deceiving the 
PwpIe with Slogms About ~ i b t ; t ~  dnd E q d t y . )  
CIear, one would think. 
Bourgeois writem art fond of depicting MPnrisln & 
like the old tsarkt barradra, where everything was subordinad 
to the 'Wcipk" of +ty. Marxists cannot be "ponsibIt 
for tbt ignawm and stupidiq of bourgeob wxim. 
T h c r e ~ o t b t n t l Y c h U b t t h a t t h e o o n ~ i n t h e m i n d e .  
of iadividual members of h e  Party ooncemhg Marxian so- 
c h b  and their infamation with the equalitatian tendencies 
of agticulmd commuacs, are as fit as two p to the 
bourgaois views of our KLcftist" blockheads wbo at one t&ie 
idtalizcd the agndturat commune to d an anent that t h y  
evca tried to implant the commune in the fadorb where 
d d l e d a d ~ d w c r k ~ & h w o r k i n g a t h i s h i a ~ d e , t a  
put his wages into the comma fund which was then ,ithad 
out +y. We h a w  what ham harm hfatltiIe &rim 
exercises of our "Ltftist" blockheads c a d  our industry. 
As y& see, the mmaats of the ideohgy of the defeated 
antitiPatty groups still display rather consi#et&le tenacity. 
It goa without aping that if t h e  "Leftist" view ,were to 
viumph in the Patry, the Party would ctaae to be Marxian, and 
the calldm farm movement would M y  be c k g a n m d .  
Or take for t~ample the quation of the id-: "Mu4e 
mlhcrivc f m c r  welt-to-domN This sIogan not only &em al- 
locbve fatme~s; it &em the w o r k  to a far larger exten% 
h w e  we want to & all the workers welI-+ to amble 
them to lead a well-tpdo and cultured exist- 
One wwld think the point was clear* There wuId ~~ 
hien no we drawing- capitdim in October, 1917, and 
F4 .I 
1 
A f o r a ~ h o f  years if r r r t a t t n o t ~ - &  4- 
pbopk * tw -*- 
the h l i h  of ~ ~ p e t t y  a d  p b  ,' 
g c t , d d d l c l e a r a n d e s b # n r i a l l y t b ~ d q p m k  
ptrpltriry, muddie d cum& among a see 
wr-mmhm ~ p o t ~ s r o g a t l , t h t y ~ a f t -  
&es d*odq they s d n u .  
Howi iha l lwebeab Ie tod  
Apparu~t l~ ,kpppclopttdonotunctedtbata~gdf  
l m w t c n r h e s r o g a a W o t l r i e h p d d P n d r t h e ~  
~ o r $ r o u p s + ~ ~ i o r t h e p u r p ~ ~ o f  
and of cxproiring them, w h e w  d& 
the w e l l - d o  existence of dl &WE h- 
. . ~ c l r r d e s  all psddity of tht cxplohtian of 
i n t h e ~ o f 3 r t i n i ~ ~ o f  t!%.NHV@'= 
*, when eapi* was pady wb&*t.= 
-nmng.& j & ~ - t ~ # , # & @ & - ' : ;  
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the p-t form of agriculture. I need not mention that 
the slogan, 'hake wery d e a i v e  farmer well-todo," is not 
isolated, but is k p a r a b i y  coaneaed with the slogan, "make 
all collective farms Bolshevik farms!' 
Is it not dear that in essence the slogan, "enrich y ~ m l v a , "  
war a call for the restoration of capitdimJ whereas the slogan, 
"make every mhctivc fanner well-do," L a call to f i d l y  
crusb the last remnants of capitalism by increasing the economic 
pwver of the collective farms and by ttansfonning all collective 
farmers into well-to-do toilers? (Voices: Quire trrre!) 
Is it not cltar that there i s  not, nor can there be, anything 
in common benveen these two slogans? (Voices: Quite true!) 
the poor w h  there are mpidist elemem and the poar w 
are egploited by t& capitalists. But when the capitalist e 
don, the task of the LMinists is not to perpauatt and 
r a n y l o n g s r a a d a r c p ~ t k m y ~  
&dof Irrring. ~ - w a m t # ~ ~ o f i w  
be any &At that this mnfdon in the duds 
Ladeeeionuf theviews of our'Tuftist" bkkhe& 
and who regatd the mlIectivt farms as & 
we, here tm, on this quest*& the remnants of the 
f the defeated anti-party groups have not yet losr 
that had such b&$ed v k u  
qwsh.  Here tcm, L 
d d m g e r ,  I h a v e s p k a a f t h e t e m c i ~ ~ f &  
of oppiiuliw. It rbovld be o b r d  rbu th nd$ 
I v i d  of mpi& in the minds of men are much more ma-  , 
dous in the sphere of the natioaal question than in aay &t 
sphere They are more tamdoh beAw t h y  are to die 
&'s f d  was an individual case, an exception to the dc. TLt 
ia not me.  The fall of Skrypnik a d  his group in the Ukraine 
is not an mception. Similar "&lo~ations" are k e d  among 
certaja commb in other nadsaal repubha. 
What dam? a deviation towarda natianaliam rn-- 
tive of whether it is a deviation towards Great Russian nation- 
sJism or towards local nationalism? The deviation towards 
nationalixm is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of tbt 
working &s to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisk The 
deviation towards nationalism rtflcadi the attempts of 'bne's 
own" "nationalH bourgeoisie to undenaine rhe Soviet system 
and to restore capitalism. As you see, both these 
have a a m i o n  WCR This source is a depmfs~re 
ist internationalh If you want to keep both thtse deviations 
under fire, then aim prhariIy against thb source, against 
who depart from internationalhn-hapetive of whether rht 
d e v i a h  is towards local nationalism, or towards Great R w  
There is a controversy as to which deviation repweats the 
major danger, the deviation towards Gmt Russian nab- 
or the deviation towards local na&? Under present con- 
ditions this is a formal and themfore a pupaeIeas controversy. 
It would be absurd to attempt to give ready-made recigs for 
the major and minor danger that would bt suitable for ail 
times and for d cditiom. Such recipes do not exist. The 
major danger is the deviation against w W  we have ceased ao 
t h d  rtpplaue.) 
I 





reptwat the major +, h 
to fight against it and enabIed it to gtow to 
the i a t e r v e n t i d  this d t A -  - 
a as to which is the I 
I policy. Hue too, as in 0 t h  
there is no little confusion in the miads of certain 
of the Party. hetimes while fighting against thc 
hands away from the Qft" 
it on the assumption that it 
dangerous. This is a vcty 
emus mistake. This is a cona&n to thd 
is impermissible for a munbw of & 
It is aU the more impermissible for the reason that re: 
completely slipped to the +tiom af 
tp, so that there is no lwger any essential di&mw 
h" srt tht Righa wtto 
Left phrases. Now the "Lefts" 
the mrnrma of our statement. Take kt 1 .  
t Bdetin. Whr do Messieurs 
e abou~ in what dws 
i d f ?  They  demand: the air- 
of a number of our industrial enterprises to concessi-res b- 
must they are unprofitable. 
Such is the program of the contemptible cowards and wit- 
&tors, a counter-revolutionary program of r w t o h g  capid- 
ism ia the U.SSR! 
In what way d m  it Met from the pragram of the cztreme 
Rights? CZtarly, it differs in no way. It follows then that the 
'Zefts" have openly associated themselves with the counter- 
revolutioaary program of the Rights in order to enter into a 
bloc with them and to wage a joint struggle against the Party. 
After this, how mn anyone say that the '%fa" are not dan- 
gerous, or are only slighdy dangerous? Is it not dear that 
those who talk such rubbish bring grist to the mill of the bit* 
enernies of Lwiaism? 
As you see, here too, in the sphere of deviations ftom the 
line of the Party-irrespeaive of whether they art deviations 
on general policy, or deviations on the national +e 
survivals of capitalism in the minds of men, including the minds 
of certain members of our Party, are suffidently tenacious. 
These, then, are a few serious and urgent questions concern- 
ing our ideologiml and politicaI wark on which lack of clarity, 
confusion and e m  direct deviation from Leninism exist among 
certain strata of the Party. And these are not the only qua- 
tiom which could setve to &momrate the confusion of mind 
among certain membws of the Party. 
After rhu, a n  it h said that all is well ia the Patty? 
Clearly, it m t .  
Our tasks in tht sphere of ideological and political work are: 
(1) To nise the theoretical level of the Party m im 
p h ;  
(2) To intensify ideologiu11 work in alt the l i d s  of rht 
I Party; 
bf h b h  k tbt 
the e P & q  
TminSlr m- 
ca&n d frcm Memb*hil iah; 
(6) e t i d y t a v  thtidsofogyd -of 
2 P ~ ~ ~ L ~ ~ ~ ~ o P ~ T I o N A L , ~  
Ikam+&t& 
t h t p p b t r t o f ~ t i d ~ d  - 
~ a s d a s i & ~ o f ~ a n r i ~  
gmupsia&Ebtty. 1bspdcesoft fs t~~~ldbisbwicaI&g-  
b u s b e e n ~ i n ~ d ~ a n d t k a t d p t o b h h m h  
& N o t a f e w d v t d ~ P n d ~ h a ~ ~ ,  
W e a t e c o a t f n w t b d b y a h c a p o f p r o b h ~ ~  
~ B p t i t & a ~ y x r s c a n t h a t t h e m a j o r p e t r t o f  &wt 
+ h a r C a y w ) 1 p s d , ~ i n e h i a ~ & ~ t ~  
of our Party is btpond qrrcstios. 
B u & h & r t r h e ~ t i o m a r i e c s : 6 0 w w e r e ~ ~  
~ h o w w e m & y a & m h c d i n f a c t , w h a t ~ e w m p t a u p  
r h e - e ~ t a k &  
aaane of i d f ,  atwadd&;, 
I t  
sotospeak. ' X h i s , 0 f ~ ~ ) ~ i s w r o n &  Thostwhothitrlclikt 
that are greatly &taken, Only incorrigible bureaucrats and 
A c e  rats can think that. As a ma= of f e  h e  s u c m m  
and victories were obtained, not automatically, but as a m 1 t  
of a fierce struggle to carry out the Patty line. V i  nevct 
cornea by idf--it hat to be dragged by the hand Good 
rediolutions and declarations in favor of the geaeral Iine of tkt 
Party are only a beginning, they merely czprcss the d&re to 
win, but it is not victory, After the cormt linr: h a  k n  given, 
after a correct solution of the problem has been found, sucws 
depends on tbt mamm in which the wotk is u r p i d ,  on tht 
o q p k t i o n  of the struggle for the applimtioa of the h e  of 
the Party, on the proper 6el& of wotkw on s u p t d h g  the 
f & h n t  of the decisions of the leading organs. Without this 
the correct rine of the Party and the correct solutions aft in 
danger of b e i  severely damagtd. More than that, after the 
correct political line bas ixm given, the organizational work de. 
ddes everything, including the fate of the politicd linc i d f ,  
i.e., its success or failure. 
As a matter of facr, victory was achieved and won by a sys- 
tematic and stern struggle against all sorts of difticulties that 
lay in the path of carrying out the Party he, by ovemnning 
these dittidties, by m & i  the Party and the workiag dam 
for the p u p s e  of ovetmahg these d&dties, by o r g a h h g  
the struggle to overcome these &cultiea, by removing ine&$ent 
workers and selecting better ones capable of waging the struggfe 
against Cwcultim. 
What are h e  &cukes, and where art they coneeakd? 
These &adties are difliculties of out organizational work, 
diflicuftieg of our organktional leadership. They are am- 
cealed within oufseIves, in our leading workers, in our organiza- 
tion, in the apparatus of our Party, of our Soviets, our =no& 
8 2  
w h a t d u # ~ m # n ?  It- 
of & -for tht fair* 
on ourseloes alone. 
WchavehauP~mmrrhnnnro&memknand * Iit the Young Communist h g u e _ w e  haw tnwe 
~ E o ~ m i f l i o n m e m l r c r s a n d d b  Wehm,werthm * W O h r  and pMnt  c m q d e m k  The Aktlm, 
l & r m n l n n d ~ e ~ L e a g u e l u s m o r e t h m t n e b e m i l l i r m  
T h e m d e w n i o t l s h a v e a M m b a h i p o f ~ n r ~  
mi&?& I t - i s ~ ~ o € g a n b a ~ E b a t w t ; r t e o b I i g o d  
~ D U T  Abci if,'mtwih& the * of d 
aad of such +t;es, which fdrare the 
of we stdl mfFa f r m  a numbet of d e k  - + upool Q U = ~  uaotl 
B S U ~ ~ ~ 1 ~  
h u a a c y  in the admmma . . tion depprcmena; idle chattet 
h t  "1e;tcktahip in general'' h d  of r d  and concrete h d -  
edip; the funeeional system of or-tion and tht &me of 
pttsorsal rapddiv; d q m d h t i o n  in work and bquali- 
t a r i a l h i n & ~ a y s e t m ; t h e h o f s ~ t i c ~  
viriom over the f d h m t  of dtdhm; far of self-cri* 
t h e  ate the so- of wr d&ul& that is w k  our di& 
& ~ n o a r l i t ~  
It d d  be dvt to dink that it is p d d c  to d t  b e  
d&tIdes by mmns af rdut ions  and or&. The bureaucrats 
h a . e l o n g ~ p a s t ~ i n t h e a r t o f ~ t i n g t t C t i r  
I+tytrothedecisi~18of&Partyandofthtgovernmrntin 
w o & a n d p i g w & ~ b i a d d  Itlordetroaombettbtre 
d&&k it w neaessary to oboM the log be- our or- 
ganktiorral work and the req&mwt% of the +ticat lint of 
the Party, it - mccwq to & the Itvel of orphtionnl 
~ P i a a l l s p b o f  n a t i ~ d ~ ~ ~ t h e f e v e l o f  
l i t i d  leademhip, it was to seare that wr a t p h -  
donaI d guarantees the apphtion of the plitid. 
slogans and &&na of the Patty. 
In otdtt to oombat these and &ve suwa it 
wasntetssarytoorg&erheosruggIemovexcwnt~di&d- 
ti3 it was neclessary to h w  the - of the w o r k  and 
pamu hm this attuggb it waa to mobilizt the 
P a q  itaelf, it was nccessarp to purgc the Party and the busi- 
ncm o r p k t i o n a  of udiable, &Ie and dem0rah.d 
clemtnts. 
what was rquired for that? 
Wt had to or@: 
(1) htcniw self-aitkh and the ~ u r c  of dw deidtts 
in 0- work; 
(2) Tht m & t h  of the P a q ,  ttade 
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(3) T b e ~ ~ o f t h c m u r a o f t h * a L - m d p a r  ;I 
pe for t h c & g h t r o a p p I y t b e a l o g u u . n d ~ o f t k  1 
' r r r r p d o f F h e g Q ~ ;  
Q ~ h r m t v i o n o f c r m p d t i r r n p n d s b o c ~ h i g a d t d g  
(5) A wide network of polidGPl dqarmmm of & 
radmmtst~t ions .PndSo&farmsdt6tbringing~fof~  
'artySoPittIwdus$;pneareroothtvilIagg; 
(6) The splitting up of the mmmiam&& the thtehitf boorda 
n d ~ d b r i n g i n g t b e ~ ~ p n t ~ r e r m t h  
(71 The lbolition of d t p m d h t i o n  in work pnd tbc 
quidat& of +w in.& wages eptmj 
( ? l ) T h t ~ t i o n ~ f t h e " ~ ~ s g s t e m , ~  
d -and mkingthe ~ ~ ~ t i n g  
49) h a d n g  supervision of fd&mt of de&im and 
~ t h e l i r s e m P v a t d s t h c r e o r ~ t h o f t b e C a n t r p t C o n -  
01 Commrssroa . d ~ W ~ a n d P e a s s n t s ' ~ i n d I e  
iraaion of dl .futther ituswsing ~upmishn  of the W&tm 
F & s h ;  
(10) The d e m h g  of Wed d z m  ftom ehc officm to 
~ ~ n e a r e r t o ~  
(11) The & frclm -t ., 
pmmats of hchgible h u ~ a t s  and 6 . m ~ ;  
(12) R d  from theit poatg of thost who v i o h  the 
. .  
ppl&usiness-like people, p p l e  capable of securing concrete 
Party Soviet discipline; 
leadership of the work tntrwtcd to them and the tightening of 
(13) The purging of Soviet and business organizations ad 
reduction of their staffs; 
(14) Lastly, the purging of the Party of unreliable and de- 
moralized persons. 
These, in the main, are the rmmi which the Parry had to 
adapt in order to combat d&dties, to to our organizational 
work to the level of pliticai leadership and in this way to se- 
cure the a p p k t i w  of the Party he. 
You know that this is exactly the way the Central Cammit- 
tee of the Party carried on its organizational work during the 
period under rtview. 
In dm, the Central Committee was guided by the great 
thought uttered by Lttrin, namely, that the main thing in or- 
g a n i z a h l  work is -the seiection of people md sup~rririon 
of f ulfdmmt of decisions. 
_LI--- 
In regard to the slection of people and ihe dismissal of those 
w h  f a  to justify the confidence pl;ll.ed in them, I would 
like YO say a few words. 
Apart from incorrigible buteaucrats and o&ce rats, about 
the removal of whom here are no diflerences of opinion among 
us, there are two other typed of workers who retard out work, 
hider our work, and prevent us from advancing. , 
One of these types of workers are those who have rendered 
certain d c m  in the past, people who have become "aristo- 
crats" as it were, who cotrsider that the laws of the Patty and 
Soviets were not wxittrn for thm, but for f d .  These art the 
who do not think it is theit duty to f&I the deeisiolMi 
f Party and s t a t e  disdphe. What do they base 
' 
of the =vices thty haw tendered in the past. 
They must be degraded to lower posi- ,,,. 
and this must be announced in the press. (Voices: Qite 
in order tq knock the pride out of 
swelled-beaded aristomat-buteatmatti, and to put them in 
d type of workers. I hve  in mind 
tterboxs, f would say, honest chaktrboxgs (hughter), 
who are honest and loyal to the Soviet govcmmen~, but ' 
e itw+E leadtrs, who are incapable of Mganizing ;my- 
=don wi& one such mmtade, 
.a very q x c r c d  comrade, but an incorrigible dramrk, who 
, was apable of submerging any living cause in a flood of t&. 
'-well, )rere is the conversation: 
I: How are you getting on with the sowing? 
St&? W e  have mobil- I 
bluntly, (Lwcghtm.) , 
He: There is a turn, Corntack Stalin; m there will be a 
m. ( h g h t m . )  
I: But d? 1 
He: We can observe m e  p r o m .  (Laughter.) 
I: But for a11 that, how are you gettiDg on witb the mwhg? 1 
He: Nothiug has come of the sowing as yet, Cum& 
S& (G-d laughter.)' 
Here you have the phyhgmmy of the chatterbox. They 
have mobiIid h t v e s ,  they have put the q a d o n  bluntt~, 
r h t y h a v e a t u m a n d s l r m e ~ h u t e h i n g s n m a i n a s t h e p  
were. 
This is dy the way in w h i d ~  a Ukralaian worker onae 
&Abed the state of a certain oqank t ion  when he waa adrad 
whether this organization had aay de6n;te line: 'We&" he 
said, "they have a b e  all right, but they do not w#rt to be 
d a i  any work'' (Ldughtef.) Evidently there arc b At- 
t e b x a  in that otganktion as well. - 
And whm such cbattehxes art d i m i d  fwm their pm 
and are giwn j& far removed from operative work, they &rug 
their shoddts in perpkxity a d  a&: W h y  bave we been & 
m i d ?  Have we not done aU tbat wadi nee#isary for the am? 
Have we not organid a rally of slwck brigade d m ?  Did 
we not at conferences of 8hQ$E brigade workers prodPim tht 
slogans of the Party ;md of the government? Did we not jcct 
the whole of the Politid Btucau of the C m d  Gmdttee to 
the honorary Presidirrm? ( h g h t e r . )  Did we not send grcc~ 
ings to &wade Stdh-wtrat else do they expct us to do? 
( h g h t r r . )  
~ t i s w b e d o n e w i t h ~ ~ k i h a ~ ?  If 
they were dtowtd to remain on operative work they would mb 
& ~ d y , t h t y m u a t b t r l i a m ; r a r d f ~ S c a r t i n g *  
lgivenworkotkthraopmtiwwork. TbarkmpLa $ 
idrattcKlmxa in opl t ive  wort (Voices: Qwia ri&i A p  
m*) ". , I 
I hvcPIrtody k f l y  r e p r e p o t z b d h o w t h e G n m l ~  
t c d  the sekctim of p p h  foe the Wtt and Imkm or- 
b~ and how it p v n d  the work of tightening up ru- : * of f u l f h m  of deczom. h d e  E;agamvieh wiIl 
rheogtndaoftbtGEtp3h 
d d t h t b i s i n g r c a t e t ~ i n h i s t t p o t r o n t h e t 6 i r d ~ i ~  - 
, a 
Inouldliliemshyafcw~&hmvever,abo~tfunueworL 4 
r d  M *te&g ~fp supmiion of fulfitnent of -4 
~ ~ ~ i o n o f ~ o f  fulfilfitntofdb 
u d y i f s u p e r v i s i o n o f & M ~ o f ~ m i s ~ l p  
piad. The proper organhion of supctvisiam of th fulbiI- 
nt of de&wls t like a ~~ which dmws a h d  of 
h t o m t h e ~ e r h w h i E h & a ~ t u 9 ~ w o r k i a g a t a n y  
15 a i d  &a@ the tiurrPumts illto & light of day. We can 'I 
r with- d t y  that ninetenth of out fdum and hi* 
: d t s t m t h c l a $ E o f a p r o p e t l p ~ ~ o f g u p e r r r i a i n g  
r ~ t o f d c c i s t o n s . ' l r t r t t t ~ t b e o a y d w b t t h a t h d  
r achieve ~ C P  purpose, two condithna at least are necessary: &st, 
that the s u p e d o n  of fulfilment of decisions be systematic and 
not sporadi;; second, that the work of supeniring the f u l h e n t  
of dtxishs ia all the liaks of the Party, Soviet and busintss or- 
ganizations shall be in charge, not of second-rate people, but of 
people with authority, rhe lackrs of the organhtions themselves.. 
?he organhd& of supemidon of the f d f b e n t  of decisions 
is of supreme imporrace for the a n d  leading institutions. 
Owing & irs f- of orgaaization, the Workm' and P-ts' 
Inspection cannot satisfy the rquirements of a well-ofganized 
system of supervising the fuI6Iment of decisions. Several years 
ago, when our economic work was simpler and less satisfactory, 
and when we could expea that it was possible to inspect the work 
of all the commcommissariats and of dl the business o ~ t i o n s ,  the 
Workers' and Peasants' Inspeaion was gmd enough. But now, 
whta our economic work has grown to an enormous extent and 
has become more complicated, and when it is no Ionger necewq, 
sot posshe, to inspert it from one center, the Workers' and Peas- 
ants' Inspection must bt rimgankd What we need now is not 
an iaspcaorare, but :he supervision sf the ful&ent of the de- 
cisions of the center-what we need now is the control of thc ful- 
filment of the decisions of the center. We now need an organiza- 
tion that will. not set itself the universal aim of inspecting every- 
thing and evetybdy but which will concentrate its attention on 
the work of control, an the work of supervising the f d f h c n t  of 
the &ions of the central bodies of the Soviet govexament. 
The only organizatios that can fulfil this function is a Corn- 
&on of Soviet Control of the Comd of P~eopk's Commhars 
of the U.S.S.R., which shalI work under the instructions of the 
Council of People's CommissPts and have its tepmentatim in 
the districts who will be independent of the I o d  authorities. And 
in order that this organization may have suflicient authority and 
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It worker* the candidam for the thmlmon . . of s a d  
muse be nominated by the Patcg C o q w  and dad 
dw CounaI of Paople's G m m k a m  a d  the Central h- 
Committee of the U.S.S.R. 1 think that only su& an ot. 
tion can tighta up Soviet coflrrol and Sopitt discipline. 
for the CenttaI Control Cbmmkion, it i s  well known that 
set up primariiy, and mainly, for the purpose of averting a 
rn the Party. You know that at one time there really was 
danger of a split in tke Party. You know that the Ceatral 
trol Commission and its organizations d in averting 
danger of a split. Now there is no longer any danger of a 
But there i an imperative need for an orpization that 
txate its attention maidy on the work of supwking' 
eat of the decisions of the Parry and of its 
ttce. Thc only -tion that d d  fuM this futac- 
u a Cornmiasion oi Party ConmI of the Central Commirta 
Ebe CP*S.U, working on the ~~ of the Party and of 
Ceatral Camittee and having its -=ti= in the dis- 
who will be independent of tht id It 
' b u t  saying that such a m q m d d e  orgmhtion muat widd 
h r i t y .  And in order that it may wield s&cient a w b -  
in order that it may be able to rake pmadhga against 
ee, who h- a m m i d  any &anory the membem of this 
ion muat be elected and d i d s d  only by the sup- 
tht Partg, *., the Party Gngress. There wmot be 
that such an orpnbtion wi l l  be quitt eapabIt of sc- 
coatrof of & fulfilment of the decishu of tht * 
f the Party and of tightening up Party d k i p h  
Our tasks in the q h r t  of otgankational ItPderahip an: I 
(I) To mtinue to make our organhatid work d ~ ~ ~ m d t l -  ! 
-tt with the rcquiretrats of the politid line of tht Party; ! 
(2) To & orpahtianal hdepship to the Iwel of poIitid 1 
lea*, 1 
(3) To secure that oqanktional Ieadership shaII fully guar. 
mtet the apphtion of the p o l i k l  dogam and d& of tk 
-0 
I haw now cane to the end of my comr&. 
PVhat condush must bt dmwn from it? 
1 
i 
E + y n o w ; 1 Q n i t s t h o r o u r ~ o t t g t e a t d c n -  ' 
tramdinmy. In a reIatiw1y short period of time our country 1 
has been wansfattd to the rails of indusmialktion and e o k -  
tivizatiom. The Fmt Five-Yeat Plan has been succwfuItp car- 
tiad out. This muses a wnse of pride and in- the amfi- 
&ace of our workers in their own stre~gth. This is d very 
god, of But s u m s m  somerimta haw their dark & 
T h q ~ t i m e s g i v e r k t o ~ & g e r s w h i c h , i f a f I o P P a d t o  
ddop, may wreck the whole There is, for tlrampIe, 
the dsnger that wme of our eomt.ades may have t k i c  hmdn 
mmmibt6cLamcewx ~ ~ v e ~ c u c s l i L e t h a ~ . r y o u  
h o w .  Thereisthedangerthatattainofourmnr&hPving ; 
b t  intoxiad with suaeeas, wil l  get swt1Ied-M and begin 
t o d ~ t r ~ ~ w i t h b o a s t f u l s o n g g s u c h a s :  "Plrtauefot 
nobady," W e ' l l  hock everybody into a d e d  hat," etc This 
is bp no means excluded, m&. There is nothing m o ~ r  daa- 
p u s t h a a m m d s o f  &kind, becausetheydiaarmtbePaq 
a n d & & i ~ & .  X f s u e h m m d s w e r t t o p ~ t t  
in our Party we would be fd with the danger of d m  
being wredctd Of mum+ the Fmt RwYear Plan haa been 
irucetssfuIIy arried out. Tb b tm But this h not, md 
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' la - 
t n d t h t m a t w , d  & f w r u s b t h e M k  
h o w r h a t p b a r t c a t r i e d o u t i n t h t ~ ~ d i f l i -  
cl 
d .  
by the ruct~sses achiwcd, a d  must not get 
a u a x # S # h w e h P d h o ~ i # e &  
~ o f E h e P a r t y , a n d ~ ~ m w e r e a b l t t o ~ t l a e ~  
for the ptpoae of app1pi.e this tirre. N& to s y ,  witbout 
~ ~ W t w w l d n o t h P v e a e h i e p a d ~ ~ ~ ~ t  
A - -  I There cannot be any doubt that as bng as m r m a h  true to these tenets, as long as we have thii compass, we will a&t srtc-, 
c e s a  in our work. 
It is said that in the West, in some countries, Marxism has 
already been destroyed. It is said that it was dtstroped by the 
baurgeois-nationalist trend known as fa* That is nowcase, 
of course. Only those who are ignorant of history can talk like 
that. Marxism is thc scientific expre~~ion of the f d e n t a l  
intereso of the working $as. In order to destroy M a h  the 
working cIass must be destroysd, And it is impossible to &troy 
the working class. More than eighty years have p a d  since 
Marxism stepped into the arena. Dluring this time mres and 
hundreds of bourgeois governments have tried to destroy k- 
ism. And what happened? Bourgeois governments have come 
and gone, but Marxism still goes OIL ( b u d  dppfd l~l t . )  
More than that, Mandsrn has achieved complete victory on 
one-sixth of the globe and ashiewd victory in the very country 
in which M a m b  was considered to have been utterly b y e d  
( L u d  appluu~e.) 
It is not an accident that the country in which MPrxism 
achieved complete victory is now the mly country in the world 
which knows no crisis and uaemploymtnh whereas in ait other 
countries, includmg the faxist c o ~ ~ t r i e g  &is and unemphy- 
ment have been reigning for four years. No, coma& it b not 
aa ac&t. (PTolonged appZawe.) 
Yeq comrades, out s u m  'are due to the fact that we 
worked and fought m& the banner of M a f g  Engels and L m h  
Hence the second conclusion: to remain loyal to the end to 
the gredt banner of Mmx, Engels and b i n .  (Appf~se. )  
The working class of the U.S.S.R. is strong, not only k u a e  
it has a Le&ist Party that has been tried in h&; it is strong, 




1 count&-& L one of the mme~tunes of rk 4 
DdmightoftheRepubIicofSoviee~. ThewobmthetJPygqt. -f! 
g ~ t t h t ~ g ~ o f t h c - U . S S ~ i s t k e h c k ~ .  44 
:&worIdpIecariat. T h a t i a q g d  I t ~ ~ ~ ~ t t m  
orld proletariat is prrp.ml m continue to render J1 the tw ,- # 
m to the warking c k  of d~ U.S.S.R. But this imp= r 
~ s u g ~ w d u r y u p n n r .  ~ t m . n r u t ~ ~ a t w e i n m ~ ~ t p m v e d ~  
rcrf tbt W l c  title of tht s k k  bdgadt of the p r o k k m  d .* 4 
11;mt of tht pmktarimrr of dl countries. (Applaun.) 
Such axe tbe 
td Lain! ( L o 4  mi pr~lmged &awe.) 
E .> CONCLUDING REMARKS 
[At tha d u s b  of tht debate o i ~  tk report of the @ 
we Gmmim Cowradt Stalia waa eolEod upon to qly, :@ 
ti;d & foIlawiu&J ' i>l 
95 . r  . A 
6 m r p b s t h & a t t h ~ ~ h u & ~ m m p b ;  
~ l t l l i t y d ~ . m c a g o u r ~ ~ o a t a n s y , o l r ~  
~ o f P a t t y p o f i c y . A s p b w , k o b j e c t i a m s w h & a  
~ m b d ~ ~ q e t L  ~ r n c m d i n a y ~  . 
~ ~ 0 f t h e & d o r p  
P . l c y k h d + y d  (A*.) Tbd-*ii 
tbtreanynood&dia~a+inrcpJytot6a&P I 
~ t k e t ~ b n a b d f m t  Pcrplirmetbetefo#tordrair 
fmn&aspttEhinqly. (Ilold+. Voice:@ 
bw S W  Thc delegate$, d st&& k g  tht C C I t m w  
- -3 
2 . T o ~ G o m t a d e ~ ' s q m r t d # r ~ a l  
Pnrty o r p k h m  to be gui&d in the whoIe of tbdf w d  bg
t b e + t u s d t a s h p u t ~ i n C o m t a d e ~ ' s ' r q # c c  
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